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THE THIN CORPORATE LINE: LOSS OF
LIMITED LIABILITY PROTECTION
JAMES R. GILLESPIE*
Business and popular mythology and corporate jurisprudence
generally accept unquestioningly the concepts of the limited liability
of the investor-shareholder and the discrete personality of the cor-
porate form. An inseparable interdependence is supposed between
the two concepts. Pedantically and occasionally tartly discussed
and criticized in legal and economic journals,1 these two assump-
tions are immensely helpful to the business lawyer in explaining
the advantages of incorporation to his client, to the law teacher
in distinguishing business forms and legal principles and conse-
quences, and the court in selecting its law and determing the results
in a given case. But these concepts are in fact relative and subject
to legal fissures. Theoretical and metaphysical arguments concern-
ing the concepts aside for the moment one must remember the
reality of the judicial hammer variously known as "piercing" the
corporation veil, disregarding corporateness, or pushing away the
entity web which seems to negate the perfection and consistency
elsewhere accorded the two concepts.
In a decade notable for its lack of symmetry and swirls of
change it may seem unsurprising that the symbiosis of those two
concepts is being frequently judicially disrupted. But the changes
cannot be traced to this epoch. Pure judicial inventiveness in the
area of corporate law is no novelty-witness the application of the
"de facto" doctrine to corporations, their officers, and fusions, the
stockholder's derivative suit, the fiduciary principles governing the
actions of management and majority or dominant stockholders, the
recognition of the stockholder's preemptive rights and right to
inspect corporate books, and the private remedy granted share-
holders for violations of the federal securities laws. Like these doc-
trines, judicial willingness to deny limited liability to shareholders
antedates this decade and by over a century. In Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux,2 Chief Justice Marshall dealt with the question
* LL.B., University of Illinois; LL.M., Yale University; Associate Professor of Law,
Indiana University.
1. Compare Deiser, The Juristic Person, U. PA. L. RPv. 131 (1908) with Kessler with
Limited Liability For AU: Why Not A Partnership Corporation, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 235
(1967).
2. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). Compare Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Weaton) 787, 765-68 (1824).
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whether a corporation constituted a citizen. The Supreme Court
declared:
[T]hat invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere
legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a
citizen; and consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the
courts of the United States, unless the rights of the mem-
bers, in this respect, can be exercised in their corporate
name.3
Noting this country's concept of the corporation "derived entire-
ly from the English Books" the Court approved earlier English pre-
cedent stating:
In that case, the objection, that a corporation was an in-
visible, intangible . . . mere incorporeal legal entity, in
which the characters of the individuals who composed it
were completely merged . . . was considered. The judges
unanimously declared . . . they could look beyond the cor-
porate name, and notice the character of the individual ...
It appears to the court, to be a full authority for the
case now under consideration. 4
This article will endeavor from several perspectives to view
corporate investor liability under the "piercing" doctrine. The his-
torical background of the doctrine will be outlined, its various for-
mulations and criteria analyzed, and the effect of the type of corpor-
ation involved and the nature of the claimant on the application of
the doctrine will be reviewed. An effort will be made to ascertain
whether new or modified legal tests ought to be devised and whether
the state legislatures should be encouraged to intervene to deal
with the problems giving rise to the doctrine of disregarding cor-
porateness.
Before tackling these matters some general observations about
the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity seem in order.
First, knowledge of the doctrine's existence is not particularly helpful
in assuring the investor's goal of limited liability in entering the
corporate enterprise. This is so because of the imprecision of its
various formulations and the inability to predict with reasonable
certainty the moment or circumstances of its availability. This in-
herent difficultly is illustrated by the famous dictum of a federal
district court in 1905:
If any general rule can be laid down, . . . it is that a cor-
poration will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general
3. Bank of the United States v. Deveax, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 85 (1809).
4. Id. at 89.
364
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rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears;
but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,
the law will regard the corporation as an association of
persons.5
This statement cannot be much improved upon or clarified today.6
The equitable nature of the doctrine of disregarding corporateness
demands flexibility and adaptability which inevitably leads to con-
fusion in stating and applying the doctrine.7 Second, the doctrine
itself is sometimes hard to reconcile with repeated judicial decla-
rations that incorporation for the purpose of attaining limited liability
is unassailable and with the generally unexcepted grant of limited
liability by the legislature to the investors of a properly incorporated
business. Third, the loosely stated principle is applied equally to
the single close or public corporation and to parent-subsidiary and
affiliate relationships. A consequence is that the same tests under
the principle in some instances will be applied to different types of
corporations and relationships. While some overlapping of substan-
tive law is to be expected because the objective of the plaintiff is
the same in all such cases, it is also true courts should be more
attentive to the different natures, modes of operations, purposes,
and resources of each type of corporation in framing standards and
assessing the justice of a particular result. Fourth, as a concomitant
to treating different corporate structures differently under the doc-,
trine, account must be taken of the nature of the wrong, be it a
delict or contractual, and the nature of the claimant, whether an
individual or entity. Fifth, it must be remembered the principle
may be applied at the time of formal incorporation or at any other
point thereafter during corporate life. Indeed the longevity of the
corporate enterprise involved usually affords the investor no greater
5. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (Cir., E.D.
Wis. 1905).
6. See Comment, Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subgldiary or Affiliate, 71
HARV. L. RV. 1122 (1958) which laments the consistent failure of courts to state specific
ratiocination in applying the "piercing" doctrine. Fletcher is equally unhelpfll stating: "If
any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is that a corpora-
tion will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to
the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public conven-
ience.. . the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons." 1 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 41, 167-168 (rev. ed. 1963). Nor do the standard corporate law
hornbooks offer completely reliable grounds to guide the practitioner. H. BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS, ch. X (rev. ed. 1946) ; ]E. HENN, CORPORATIONS, ch. 7 (1961) ; G. HORNSTEIN,
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 30 (1959) ; N. LATrrn, LAr'iN ON CORPORATIONS ch.
2 (1959) ; R. STrVES, STEVENS ON CORPORATIONS ch. 3, 20 (2d ed. 1949). In the case of
close corporations, which are perhaps most susceptible to the "piercing" doctrine, the lead-
ing treatise does not offer certitude and predictability as to when personal liability will be
imposed. 1 F. O'NE&L, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.10 (1958).
7. 1. W. FLE-rcnmi, supra note 6 at § 41.2, 177-78 states:
Most of the cases announcing this rule for disregarding the corporate
entity have been in equity or equitable in nature, the doctrine being one of
equity, but there is authority that the law will follow equity in this regard,
atlhough In one view that may be questioned. (citations omitted).
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protection from liability than does the fact he may have just recently
purchased his stock.
Those forming, investing in, and managing a corporation, what-
ever its nature, would do well to remember their shield of limited
liability is vulnerable to judicial attacks, even though their business
behavior may be deemed conventional and non-deceptive. Thus, as
this article tries to intimate, two matters should be of overriding
concern to investors in avoiding this doctrine: (a) responsible man-
agement and control of the business and (b) corporate resources
adequate for the risks reasonably anticipated in the corporation's
foreseeable, normal operations, both of which presuppose perhaps
more careful business planning and projecting than may ordinarily
be given to the creation of close corporations.
I. CONCEPT AND ORIGIN OF CORPORATENESS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Modern law school casebooks on corporation law do not give
elaborate treatment to the doctrine of disregarding corporateness
or the arcane history of the entity theory and limited liability.s As
a practical matter this reflects the popular view that the incorpora-
tion process has long given rise to what are thought of as two har-
monious, essential characteristics, namely, that the corporation is a
separate jural person (fictitious entity) and limited liability is al-
ways granted shareholders. Rarely are those alleged attributes of
corporateness challenged except in limited instances such as "pierc-
ing" the corporate veil. Corporate treatises, casebooks, cases, and
practice have generally approved as accepted legal dogma the
"fiction" theory which views the corporation as a separate entity.9
This entity theory has been judicially linked to the notion of limited
liability in the well known Benintendi case:
8. R. BARER and W. CARY, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 374-402 (3rd ed.
unabr. 1959); A. PREY, C. MORRIS, and J. CHOPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
53-81 (1966) ; N. LATTIN, R. JENNINGS, and R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MA-
TERiALS 136-82 (1968) ; R. STEVENS and H. HENN, STATUTES, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 362-400 (1965). The new supplement to the Baker and Cary Case-
book reinforces this impression. W. CARY, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 230-53
(Supp. 1968). D. HERWITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS PLANNING 52-60, 98-114
(temporary ed. Part 1 1963) does not deal directly with these concepts but discusses the
related problem of corporate financial management in terms of distinguishing between
debts and equity interests and adequate capitalization. Book reviews of current corporate
law casebooks evince little concern over the treatment given the "piercing" doctrine. e.g.,
Marsh, Book Review, J. LEGAL ED. 250 (1968) ; Myers, Book Review, J. LEGAL ED. 232, 235
(1966): ("The authors overwork less important subject matter. Considerable material was
used in developing the nature of corporateness.").
9. There is of course dissent from the position corporations are "entities created by
government fiat." A. BzLuR, STUDIES IN THE LAW OP CORPORATION FINANcE 20 (1928) states:
[Ilt Is perhaps plain that a corporation was originally a matter of agree-
ment; that it remained so when share capital was introduced; and that for
practical purposes under the liberal corporation laws of today it is still so.
Berle does support the privilege of limited shareholder liability, id. ch. IV. Confusion may
be generated by using the phrases entity theory, concession theory, and persona ficta in-
terchangeably to describe the corporation. Berle rejects the concession theory which viewed
the corporation as a legislative creature subject to the sovereign's dictates in favor of a
theory permitting maximum private structuring of the business.
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The state, granting to individuals the privilege of limiting
their individual liabilities for business debts by forming
. . . an entity separate and distinct from the persons who
own it, demand in turn that the entity take a prescribed
form and conduct itself . . . according to fixed rules. .... 10
From a legal position defenders of the "fiction" theory acknowl-
edge trouble. Machen has stated:
[A]lthough corporate personality is a fiction, the entity
which is personified is no fiction. The union of members is
no fiction. The acting as if they were one person is no mere
metaphor. . . . [A]lthough corporate personality is a fiction,
yet it is a fiction founded upon fact . . . . To argue that be-
cause the personality of a corporation is a product of the
imagination, therefore the corporation itself, as anything dif-
ferent from the separate members, is a fiction would be as
reasonable as to argue that because a ship is not really a fe-
male, and is personified only by way of metaphor, therefore
it has no real existence except as a number of boards and
nails.
11
Yet Machen is not unaware that "the temptation to apply the doc-
trine of corporate personality too sparingly is much less insidious
than the temptation to apply it too freely."' 12 As an adherent to
the faith of the corporate fiction he recognizes its limitations in
corporate problem solving and its frequent irrelevance in evaluating
the merits or wisdom of a proposed rule of corporate law. The
conventional wisdom of the separate entity fiction theory has
been seriously questioned. John Dewey, writing as a layman, regards
it as "ultimately a philosophical theory that the corporate body
is but a name, a thing of the intellect."'' 3 Dewing states it as "his-
torically inaccurate and contrary to empirical observation" to hold
that the corporation "exists independently of the human needs which
fostered its development."' 4 Rejecting a status of "sanctified self-
sufficiency" for the corporation form he opts for a theory under
which the corporation is
10. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 118, 60 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1945).
The rationale of the case was subsequently overruled by changes wrought by the 1963 New
York Business Corporation Law.
11. Machen, CORPORATE PERSONALITY, 24 HARv. L. .Ev. 253, 266, 347, (1911). He re-
marks: "Therefore, what needs explanation In the common law is not the doctrine that a
corporation is an entity, but the doctrine that a partnership or other voluntary associa-
tion is not an entity." Id, at 260.
12. Id. at 356.
13. Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L. J. 655,
677 (1926). He suggests ignoring the idea of a separate personality "until the concrete
facts and relations involved" are confronted. Id. at 673.
14. 1 A. DEwiNG, FINANCLAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONs 18 n.t. (5th ed. 1953). This note
also containe a remarkably concise description of the Opinions of continental scholars re-
garding the nature of the corporation.
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[A] fiction of human ingenuity ... without the attribute of
reality, except to the extent that it acquires a reflected
reality from the human beings who . . . bring about its
conception and maintain its existence. The corporation is
a name only; and the name denotes the common purpose
... of human beings. The state recognizes this purpose and
treats it as distinct from the human beings who jointly con-
ceived it. . . . [N]either the state nor the members . . .
endow it with reality.
15
More recently Professor Hornstein noting the inadequacy of the
persona Jicta concept to describe the corporate form lists the
realist, symbol and enterprise entity theories as possible alterna-
tives or substitutes. 16 The need to advance other theories strongly
hints at the limitations, if not the virtual bankruptcy, of the "fiction"
theory in terms of its overall relevance in deciding issues of cor-
porate law. As Dewing has observed of the debate about the nature
of the corporation:
As an intellectual antinomy it is now no nearer a final
solution than when Parmenides, son of Peres, walked the
byways of Velia.
The corporation is an institution and its reality lies not in
legalistic definitions but in the part the corporation plays
in the complex balance of forces that constitutes the eco-
nomic world of the present time. 7
Obviously it is difficult to achieve scholarly agreement on the
conception of a corporation. Likewise, it is historically obscure how
the concept of limited liability became handmaiden of the separate
entity theory. Dewing's explanation is quite simply: "The legal
attributes of the corporation are mere accidents of historical devel-
opment... ."I He believes limited liability became a sine qua non
of corporateness because it was, and is, a basic assumption of busi-
nessmen. Such immunity is in fact not an "essential character-
istic" of corporateness, but an attribute "which, for reasons of social
expediency, it seems desirable to attach to the modern corpora-
tion."' 9 According to Dewing the attributes of corporateness are
determined by the economic and social environment of the time and
what "[man's] laws propose; the underlying forces of economics
dispose." 20 Deiser, seemingly in accord, regards the immunity of
15. Id. at 18 n.t.
16. 1 G. HoRuTs'n, supra note 6 § 22: "The Courts do not attempt to fit every corpor-
ation Into a single Procrusteanbed." See also R. STS"NS and IL HNN, supra note 8 at
87-46 for one of the more complete casebook discussions of theories of corporateness.
17. 1 A. DawING, FINANCAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 16-17 (5th ed. 1953).
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 14.
20. I&. at 16.
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shareholders from business debts as merely an incident of the cor-
poration's holding of property, but not a "necessary incident. ' 21
Both suggest the two concepts are by no means historically, legally,
or logically coextensive.
This latter point has been discussed by Professor Kessler who
has asked whether "limited liability" is a "natural right" of the
corporation and of no other business form. ' 22 His succinct review
of the historical evolution of the concept leads to the finding that
"the corporation . . . does not have a monopoly on the valuable
business privilege of limited liability. ' '28 Examination of such author-
ities as Holdsworth, Dodd, Williston, and Stevens produce incon-
clusive evidence on the question of whether limited liability is a
"natural right" which necessarily inheres in corporateness. 24
Kessler is properly guarded in using the term "natural right" in
light of the admonishment:
There is nothing absurd in the statement that there are
no such things as the natural rights of corporations. Certain
of them are in their nature impossible. . . . There is no
need to visualize further the juristic person. . . . The fact
exists that the moment a powerful group begins to act
toward a common end it produces a capacity for aggression
that individuals can only in the rarest cases combat. It
presents the old problem of genus against species and the
genus must . . . prevail. 25
The problem of determining the relation of limited liability to
corporateness is further complicated by the fact that pinpointing
the origins of the modern corporation is frustrating and unreveal-
ing. Kessler, for example, mentions the Romans, Greeks, Ham-
murabi and further back, but then notes our fount of law, England,
adopted limited liability on a general basis only in 1855.26 There
are also of course historical analogues of the modern corporation,"
but their development does not elucidate the connection between
corporateness and limited liability. As Dewing states:
The difficulty in all this research is to define, with any
degree of precision, the exact point in the evolution of busi-
ness or other associations when some inarticulate but
21. Delser, eupra note 1, at 235.
22. Kessler, supra note 1, at 237-38. See also Machen, eupra note 11, at S50.
23. Kessler, supra note 1, at 242.
24. Id, at 234-46. See also Bssns, supra note 9 at 1-25; 1 DEWING, supra note 14, at
19-21.
25. Delser, supra note 1, at 302.
26. Kessler, supra note 1, at 240-41. See also Gower, Some Contrasts Between Br4tish
and American Corporation Law 69 HARe. L. REv. 1369, 1370-71 (1956).
27. A. DEwING, supra note 14, at 22-27. See also A. BLELE, supra note 9, at 6-11.
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nevertheless realistic form of organization became a business
corporation in our sense of the term.
2 8
Historical evidence then leads to the conclusion there is a fortuitous
but not a determinate interrelation between the concepts of cor-
porateness and limited liability. Moreover, legal and economic his-
torians cannot demonstrate that limited liability was, and is, associ-
ated exclusively with the corporate enterprise. The visible relation
between the concepts today is reinforced by the orientation of modern
corporation statutes and popular belief, but the fact that modern
corporations lack entity attributes for many purposes and that unin-
corporated associations are granted such status bespeaks the unre-
ality of holding the concepts correlatives. Dewing has stated it
most neatly:
Fundamentally, limited liability rests upon the degree of
'insulation' attributed to a particular corporation. If the
insulation were absolute, then limited liability would appear
to follow. . . . But the insulation is never absolute ...
[Clourts have invariably broken through the formal insu-
lation of the corporation and held the stockholders liable.
2
9
Consequently, counsellor, client, and court must accept an
historical verdict which indicates not only that the origins, develop-
ment, and meaning of the separate entity concept are dubious, but
that limited liability is not perforce related to the entity theory.30
If history offers little comfort the actions of the courts offer even
less to the investor-shareholder seeking certainty in his immunity.
For years the courts have denied the limited liability for the purposes
of convenience, achieving justice, and avoiding the rewarding of
wrongdoers. Essentially a court's response to pleas to "shuck" lim-
ited liability has been governed by the equities of the particular
case. Thus any generalizations about rigid or liberal judicial ten-
dencies in this area are apt to be misleading.
II. A CURRENT OVERVIEW OF LIMITED LIABILITY AND
DISREGARDING CORPORATENESS
Doubtless the most widely used form of business association and
that which represents the greatest concentrated economic wealth
in the nation is the corporate enterprise.8 1 Public policy generally
28. 1 A. DEWinG, aupra note 14, at 21.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Using these two concepts as an exclusive basis for corporate rule-making is surely
beset with pitfalls. Assuming them to be the touchstones of corporate problem solving may
cause "Infinite harm." Machen, supra note 11, at 357. See also Comment, "Corporate Ea-
tity"-Its Limitations as A Useful Legal Conception, 36 YALE L. J. 254 (1926).
31. J. GALBRATH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967) reflects this fact regarding




favors creating and maintaining a social and economic milieu at-
tractive to business companies. Limited shareholder liability is con-
sistent with this policy and contrary judicial inclinations are unlikely
to be well received. This policy modernly applies irrespective of
the type of corporation involved. One valid distinction to draw among
different kinds of American business corporations is in terms of the
economic function each serves. The publicly-held corporation is pri-
marily designed to serve from incorporation the function of accumu-
lating capital while incorporation of the typical close corporation is
intended to emphasize the existence of a legal entity distinct from
its participants. 82
In the United Kingdom, where the public-private company di-
chotomy exists, it has been stated:
The company . . . formed may be either (1) a company
having the liability of its members limited by the memo-
randum [of association] to the amount, if any, unpaid on
the shares respectively held . . . (termed a company limited
by shares . . .); or (2) a company having the liability of its
members limited by the memorandum to such amount
as the members may . . . undertake to contribute to the
assets of the company in the event of its being wound up
(termed a company limited by guarantee . . .); or (3) a
company not having any limit on the liability of its mem-
bers (termed . . . an unlimited company .. .).as
In the United States this legal diversity respecting shareholder
liability does not exist, although there is no apparent reason to
prevent shareholders by contract or by appropriate provision in the
articles of incorporation from enlarging their personal liability.
3 4
Several state constitutions and most states in their business cor-
poration enabling laws expressly limit the liability of a shareholder
or subscriber to pay only the full consideration for which such shares
were issued or to be issued. 5 At least twenty-one states closely
follow section 23 of the Model Business Corporation Act which pre-
serves limited liability, and other states, in varying degrees, ad-
32. A. BmLE, TuE 2OTH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
33. 6 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 226 (3rd ed. 1955) (citations omitted). See L.
GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW (1954).
34. No cases have been found raising this exact point, but arguably a private contract
or a clause in the articles or by-laws enlarging the personal liability of shareholders for
business debts could be held to contravene express public policy limiting such liability.
See Sensabaugh v. Poison Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1959) (invalidating
an attempt to use corporate machinery to nullify the mandatory cumulative voting provi-
sion in the state's constitution). Since the privilege of limited liability is designed to pro-
tect shareholders, they presumably may knowingly consent to waive it. Further, barring
such arrangements might interfere with the common practice of investors in close corpora-
tions using personal credit to borrow funds on behalf of the business. See also ABA-ALI
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 48(i) (1966).
35. E.g., ALA. CONST. art 12, § 236; S. C. CONST. art. 9, § 18; W. VA. CONST. art. 11,
§ 4; IND. STAT. ANN. § 25-205 (h) (Supp. 1968).
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here to the substance of section 23.36 The most recent significant
legislation relating to business corporations, the Delaware General
Corporation Law, perpetuates this pattern of limited liability pro-
tection for shareholders.3 7 With a corporate heritage and chiefly
statutory backdrop that generally circumscribes the extent of share-
holder responsibility for corporate indebtedness it is a difficult task
to rationalize the development by the courts of both the "de facto"
corporation and "piercing" doctrines. The conflict and incongruity
are self-evident. For example, may not the court-derived "piercing"
doctrine potentially violate the separation of powers limitation, or
worse, in the light of legislative and, especially, constitutional ap-
probation of limited liability, a state public policy? This possibility
appears to have been little litigated and probably will be ignored.
The important point, however, is that legislative dominance of cor-
poration structure and governance should make courts somewhat
cautious in extending a doctrine opposed to a firmly declared public
policy.
However superficially contradictory to the legal privilege of
limited liability the "piercing" doctrine may seem, it is widely avail-
able in a variety of situations to impose liability on shareholders
beyond their immediate or prospective obligation to pay the cor-
poration for shares subscribed for or purchased. 8 Perhaps in no
36. ABA-AL. MODEL Bus. CoRp. ACT" ANN. § 23, par. 2.01, 2.02 (Supp. 1966). Such pro-
tection may also extend to shareholders of businesses exempted from the state's general
corporation act E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 39-3704 (c) (1965) (insurance companies). There
are, however, exceptions which extend the liability of shareholders for business debts. For
example, until 1963 the Michigan Constitution provided: "The stockholders of every corpor-
ation and Joint stock association shall be individually liable for all labor performed for
such corporation or association." MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (1908). The West Virginia
Constitution excepts "banking Institutions" from its limited liability provision. W. VA.
CONST. art 11, § 4. Individual shareholders of a national banking association formerly
were held "individually responsible, equally and ratably" for its debts to the extent of
their stock investment 12 U.S.C. § 63, this section was repealed by Act of Sept. 8, 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-230, § 7, 73 Stat. 457. See 12 U.S.C. 56 (1964). Corporation statutes also
deviate from the privilege of limited liability in certain cases. Shareholders of specified
institutions such as banks and trust companies are affected. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-1902 (1964). New York imposes liability for unpaid employees' wages on the ten
largest shareholders of corporations whose shares are not listed on national securities ex-
changes or regularly qubted in the over-the-counter market by members of a national or
affiliated securities association. The employee is required to furnish notice of his claim
against the shareholders within a specified time after terminating his employment. This
provision obviously encompasses close corporations. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 630 (McKinney
Supp. 1968). A shareholder who "knowingly" receives a dividend or distribution made in
violation of a corporation statute may have to contribute to a director against whom a
claim Is asserted for approving such action. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 56 (1964) ; -IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-251 (e) (Supp. 1968). This liability may indirectly accrue to the benefit of creditors.
See ABA-ALI MoDoL Bus. CORP. ACT § 43 (1960), after which the Indiana provision is pat-
terned, providing for the personal liability of directors and officers on the basis of en-
gaging in a variety of impermissible actions. In close corporations shareholder-managers
could easily incur liability under this section.
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 162 (a), 325 (1967) but see id. § 102 (b)(6) which pro-
vides that the certificate of incorporation may include a provision imposing personal
liability for corporate debts on its stockholders to a "specified extent and upon specified
conditions." A generous six year statute of limitations period is provided for bringing the
action to recover the amount of the unpaid balance of the consideration owed by the sub-
scriber or holder. Id. I 161(d). Shorter limitation periods exist In many states. E.g., IND.
STAT. ANN. § 25-205(h) (Supp. 1968) (three years).
38. Apparently the "piercing" doctrine is usually invoked only against the shareholders
of business corporations. Few cases applying the doctrine to members of a nonprofit cor-
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other area of corporate law has such a rich argot of judicial labels
of formulations grown up as in cases involving the question of
disregarding corporateness.39 The handicap of the labels is of course
their inutility as analytic tools in ascertaining when the doctrine
should apply to shred corporateness. Delineation of a specific stan-
dard encompassing all corporations is as unworkable as is a state-
ment of all the significant elements which should be applied to
different types of corporations in different contexts for determining
the applicability of the "piercing" doctrine. However, the legislative
and judicial trend in this country is to distinguish between different
types of corporations by accommodating special needs of the close
corporation (which term includes one man, family and other limited
member corporations) .40 This tendency is paralleled by an effort
to make a distinction in stating the standards for applying the
"piercing" doctrine to close corporations and to subsidiary and
other affiliate corporations when imposing liability on a parent
company.
41
Corporate writers and commentators, for example, distinguish
between closely-held corporations and parent-subsidiary relation-
ships in enunciating the substantive standards or elements which
comprise the "piercing" doctrine.42 Henn seems to insist three
tests must be met for the close corporation to retain the limited
liability advantage: formation for a legitimate purpose; conducting
business in a corporate as opposed to a personal manner; and,
beginning with an adequate capital structure.4 3  With respect to
parent-subsidiary and/or affiliate relationships he suggests five
standards to prevent the business units from being treated as assimi-
lated, namely: formation for a legitimate purpose; maintenance
poration have been found. See Garden City Co. v. Burden, 186 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1951).
Members of a nonprofit corporation are generally responsible only for such dues or assess-
ments as are levied under the authority of the articles or by-laws. R. BOYER, NON-PROFIT
CORPORATION STATUTES: A CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL 159 (1957). There would seem to be no
objection to applying the doctrine to nonprofit corporations as well as to organizations
formed under the new medical, dental and professional incorporation statutes. See H.
OLEcK, NON-PROmrT CORPORATIONs AND AssociA'roNs (1956). R. STEVENS AND H. HENN,
supra note 8, at 176-86 list by state and discuss the "professional" corporation statutes.
39. H. HENN, supra note 6, at 203 n.2.
40. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (1967) ; Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d 16, 203
N.E.2d 577 (1964).
41. See text infra.
42. See the hornbook authorities cited In note 6, supra. In addition to close corpora-
tions and public issue companies it may become necessary to consider the plight of so-
called "middle" corporations. See Folk, Roundtable on Business Associations, 20 J. LEaAL
ED. 511, 519-21 (1968).
43. H. HNx, supra note 6, at 205-06. Henn was selected chiefly because his is one of
the recent corporate law hornbooks and his views are incorporated in the casebook he co-
authored. Henn's preliminary analysis confirms the unavoidable vagueness of the "pierc-
ing" doctrine:
The general rule . . . is that corporateness--with attendant corporate at-
tributes will be recognized and will not be disregarded. . . . The test is
simply whether or not recognition of corporateness would produce unjust or
undesirable consequences inconsistent with the purpose of the concept
The concept will be sustained [only] . . . for legitimate purposes. Id. at
204-05.
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of separate transactions, accounts, and records; observing corporate
operating procedural norms (meetings, minutes, voting, etc.); ade-
quately capitalized subordinate units; and distinct public business
images.4 4 Resort to such categorical tests in the application of a
highly elastic doctrine is not wholly satisfactory. 5 A rigid enumera-
tion of the elements to be used for different kinds of corporations or
a mechanistic mode of analysis implies an immutability which is
simply incongruent with an equitable doctrine as flexible as that
of disregarding corporateness. As will be seen, courts facing the
doctrine ought to be preoccupied with the fundamental equities of the
particular case and need not concern themselves principally with
the respect shown all the statutory and corporate usages of internal
operation and the manner of doing business. They also should employ
the doctrine, which will be treated in detail later, in a manner
which discriminates between corporations and develop different cri-
teria for its application to disparate enterprises and relationships.
III. DISREGARDING THE FICTION: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
A. The Nature of the Corporation
Close Corporations
As Dean O'Neal has observed, legislatures and courts have
increasingly recognized that the special needs of close corporations
require legal privileges generally unavailable to public corpora-
tions.46  The movement began in 1948 in New York,4 7 expanded
with the 1955 North Carolina statute, 4  and peaked in 1967 with the
new Delaware General Corporation Act.4 9 The state enactments
generally simplify or eliminate formalities, approve internal control
methods similar to partnership arrangements and minimize the
drastic consequences of deadlock.50  These statutory innovations
44. Id. at 206-07.
45. E.g., Comment, supra note 6.
46. O'Neal, Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
641 (1965). Dean O'Neal believes the limited liability and separate entity concepts should
aipply to the close corporation. F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, at § 1.10. See also Folk, Round-
table on Business Associations, supra note 42 at 514-15. The rapid pace of legal develop-
ments involving close corporations is reflected In law school curriculum changes. Horn-
stein, The Close Corporation, 21 J. LEIAL Eo. 93 (1968). The close corporation is not
uniquely American. It exists, for example, in Britain [McFadyeon, The American Close
Corporation and Its British Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAW 215 (1958)], France [Treillard, The
Close Corporation in French and Continental Law, 18 LAW & CONTE p. PRoB. 546 (1953) ],
and Germany [Schneider, The American Close Corporation and its German Equivalent, 14
Bus. LAW 228 (1958)].
47. See de Capriles and Reichardt, 1947-1948 Survey of New York Law-Corporations,
23 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74,7 (1948).
48. See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation
Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432 (1956).
49. See Comment Delaware's Close-Corporation Statute, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 230 (1968).
See also Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close corpora-
tion Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525.
50 . Bradley, supra note 49, at 625-26 asserts:
It will be the author's thesis that close corporation legislation should be ani-
mated by two fundamental principles. First, a very far reaching contractual
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are complemented by several one or two man directorship statutes.51
If the underlying purpose of such statutes is realization of the need
of the participants of the close corporation to operate like partners,
the criteria now used to determine whether or not to deny the pro-
tection of limited liability will clearly have to undergo some refine-
ment and alteration.5 2 Particularly, reliance on the members com-
plying with the statutory formalities or the fact an individual owns
all the shares or dominates the concern may have to be discarded
or modified as viable criterion. 3 Probably the emphasis of the
doctrine should shift to a requirement that, within the limits of the
statute, the partnership operate in a businesslike manner, not as
an unfettered, personal fiefdom or proprietorship, that the separate
identity of corporate assets and individual property be scrupulously
preserved, and, more importantly, that there be adequate capital
to ensure against insolvency and reasonably anticipated risks.
There are good social and economic reasons for permitting the
close corporation, whether an incorporated proprietorship, partner-
ship, or family business, to possess and enjoy the same benefits
of incorporation extended to the public issue corporation.5 4 Numeri-
cally this class of corporation is our most important for it has been
estimated that it is being organized in this country at a twenty-to-
freedom should be extended to business associates to structure the ultimate
and day-to-day control of the business, to make arrangements for allocation
of the earnings and for asset distribution, and to establish ground rules for
the transfer of ownership interests and the dissolution of the corporation....
Close corporation statutes should be completely permissive with respect to
how the business is to be run.
See O'Neal, supra note 46 to the same effect. Naturally advocacy of contractual freedom
for close corporation investors coextensive with that enjoyed by partners is the root cause
of charges that the public interest is endangered. This could lead one to view the "pierc-
ing" question in part as a struggle over the extent freedom of contract will be inhibited
by the courts.
51. See Rudolph, Purther Thoughts on the One and Two Director Statutes, 20 Bus. LAw
781 (1965) ; ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 634, para. 202 (2) (Supp. 1966).
52. The literature on close corporations indicates that the recent special legislation
leaves many questions unresolved. For instance: what is the best test for differentiating
the close corporation from the non-close corporation; how severe may stock transfer re-
strictions be; or what remedies are to be permitted In the event of an impasse or threat
of dissolution? See articles cited upra note 49. But for the purposes of the effect on the
"piercing" doctrine another possible aspect of the close corporation statutes becomes Im-
portant. Professor Folk feels that there Is a risk such difficulties with the statutes may
cause states to adopt acts which are too "vague and lenient." Folk, Roundtable Discussion
on Business Awociattons, supra note 42 at 515. A possible result could be greater judicial
willingness to apply the doctrine to counter the absence of statutory regulation.
53. 1 F. O'Nw., supra note 6, at § 1.10 indicates observance of statutory norms is one
of several major tests in applying the 'Pierclng"l doctrine to close corporations. The other
clas of cases Involve inadequate financial resources. A third O'Neal theory is discussed
in note 78, infra. But both the new close corporations acts and recent judicial decisions
indicate that such norms were designed mainly to protect investors in public companies
and may be dispensed with in regard to such corporations. See Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d
16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964); Arsht and Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation
Law, 23 Bus. IAw 75, 90-93 (1967).
54. Even critics who view the latitude given close corporation managers (if not all
management) as a perilous development seem to grudgingly acknowledge the existence of
some benefits. Tennery, The Potential of the Close Corporation: A QUESTION OF ECONOMIC
VALIDITY, 14 How. L.J. 241 (1968). On the other hand, proponents of close corporation
legislation may not give enough thought to the potential harm to the public interest re-
sulting from the widest possible contractual freedom. COMPARm Folk, Roundtable Discus-
sion on Business Associations, supra note 42 with Bradley, supra note 49.
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one ratio compared to publicly-held companies.5 5 It is obviously
the intention of legislatures and some courts to facilitate and en-
courage the formation and development of close corporations:
[Tihe close corporation has become the 'ideal' arrange-
ment for the small business. It has the best of two worlds;
it can operate in the informal manner characteristic of the
partnership, but with corporate protection, and without neces-
sarily suffering a tax disadvantage.5 6
It is reasonable to assume that the principal motivation for organ-
izing most close corporations is to secure the immunity that ac-
companies incorporation. This fact combined with the new and
accelerating statutory and judicial permission to depart from well-
defined norms of behavior and regular procedures raises important
questions concerning the extent to which the legitimate interests
of creditors and the general public may require further protection.
For example, Dean Tennery questions the potential danger to
such noncorporate parties arising from the informal and free wheel-
ing manner in which the close corporation may now function:
It is also an ability that should provoke greater criticism,
since the ability to organize and to manage according to
the desires of the parties, rather than following the dictates
of some standard, can lead to excessive maneuverability
that may adversely effect the rights of innocent parties.
An ex post facto judicial finding of improper conduct is
small comfort for the unpaid creditor.
5 7
Other sources of concern include the absence of personal accounta-
bility for the participant's actions (as in partnerships) which may
breed greater imprudence in risk taking and the lack of a dis-
interested individual or group (like outside shareholders or directors
in the public corporation) who will criticize or act as a counterforce
if a dubious course of action is adopted. Tennery strongly argues:
Should the participants decide on a course of action of
extreme financial risk, this can be done and the potential
assumption of the risk can, to some extent, be placed on
other than the members of the corporation. . .. [T]he
close corporation is a device of great potential abuse because
of its inherent nature and the attitudes of those normally
55. See Tennery, supra note 54, at 253. Hornstein notes that since there are about 100,-
000 elections annually under Subchapter S for federal Income ta7 purposes the number of
operating close corporations must be many times greater. Hornstein, supra note 46, at 96.
Spe also R. STEVENS and H. HENN, "upra note 8, at 30.
56. Tennery, The Potential of the Close Corporations: A Question of Economic Validity,
14 How. L.J. 241, 255 (1968).
57. Id. at 253.
CORPORATE LIMITED LIABILITY
expected to supervise . . . corporation conduct. . . [T]he
close corporation may begin business with little or no risk
capital by the members, or their investments may be hedged
by acquiring a secured position . . . or equity capital . . .
may be quickly returned to the contributing shareholders
and thereby leaving the risk of financial failure to creditors
and general public.
5 8
Undeniably this lugubrious assessment of the risks that could be
thrust on creditors and the public by unprincipled or careless close
corporation managers is more than a speculative possibility.
On the other hand, there would seem to be at least three
countervailing factors. First, it is extremely difficult to substantiate
such charges of excessive close corporation misuse, actual or po-
tential. The period of experience under the new close corporation
statutory provisions has been too short and the reported cases do
not seem to indicate the privilege of limited liability is producing
extensive abuse. Nor does it seem naive to assume that most small
corporations are, and will be, organized to carry on ordinary busi-
ness in an acceptable way. Second, the benefit of achieving partner-
ship flexibility under the new statutes is generally purchased only
at a price. Where a shareholder's management agreement replaces
the board of directors the effect is to impose on the participating
shareholders ordinary management liability more or less coter-
minous with the control provisions of the contract.5 9 Third, if
relaxation of close corporation regulation does increase outsider's
risk-taking in transactions the doctrine of disregarding corporateness
will continue to offer a reasonable measure of protection. The
prevailing legal analysis used in applying the doctrine will be dis-
cussed elsewhere. It bears underlining that the close corporation is
highly amenable to the doctrine because it is the type of corporation
58. Id. at 256. Tennery sees corporation law proceeding to develop in two unrelated
directions: the control of "insider" activity in publicly-held corporations and liberating
close corporations from the "norm" structure. Id. at 245. See also Cohen, Federal Corpora-
tion Law, 20 3. LEGAL ED. 529 (1968); Folk, Corporations Statutes: 1959-1966, 9 CORP.
PnAc. COMm. 111, 231 (1967).
59. E.g., DEL. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (1967) provides:
A written agreement among the stockholders of a close corporation holding
a majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote, whether solely among
themselves or with a party not a stockholder, is not invalid, as between the
parties to the agreement, on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of
the business and affairs of the corporation as to restrict or interfere with the
discretion or powers of the board of directors. The effect of any such agree-
ment shall be to relieve the director's and impose upon the stockholders who
are parties to the agreement the liability for managerial acts or omissions
which is imposed on directors to the extent and so long as the discretion or
powers of the board in its management of corporate affairs is controlled by
suab agreement. See also FLX STAT. A.xN. § 608.0105 (3) (Supp. 1964) ; N.Y.
Bus. CoRP. LAW § 620 (f) (MoKinney 1963).
60. Contra, Note, Should Stockholders be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Cor-
porations?, 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1192-96 (1967). Tennery, supra note 54 does not address
himself to this point but probably would conclude that the "piercing" doctrine offers in-
adequate protection.
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most frequently formed, it is the least likely to be well managed or
have sufficient resources, and it creates less theoretical and prac-
tical difficulty with the entity and limited liability concepts because
of its similarity to the partnership. 1
The Publicly Held Corporation
The public corporation, or for that matter the large close cor-
poration, should present little opportunity to apply the doctrine.62
It is reasonable to expect that such business units will be com-
petently managed and suitably financed and equipped to absorb
risk-losses which might otherwise require recourse to the doctrine.
However, for years public corporations have demonstrated a re-
markable propensity to form independently incorporated subordi-
nate units-subsidiaries or affiliates 6 3 -thereby establishing a re-
lationship commonly characterized by two factors, the parent cor-
poration's dominance, control or ability to manipulate the subsidiary
through ownership of all, or a majority of, the sub-unit's voting
stock and a substantial management identity. There appears to
be an upsurge, rather than an abatement, of this process in the
recent wave of mergers and acquisitions .64 The multifarious pur-
poses underlying the setting up of such a relation include further
insulation of the parent corporation. 65 It should be noted such a
relationship is not necessarily confined to large publicly held cor-
porations for it is quite feasible to create the same structure with
close corporations, or, for that matter, form multiple close cor-
61. Definitional problems aside, it is perhaps most accurate to describe the close cor-
poration as "incorporated partnership" for "it has the intimacy and association of the
partnership with the vital trappings of the corporation, such as limited liability, separate
entity and permanent capital structure." Tennery, supra note 54, at 250. Kessler, supra
note 1 argues that small businessmen need operational flexibility and limited liability pro-
tection and should not be denied these advantages. But he also recognizes that protection of
the public interest and creditor is essential. The major drawback is that too few states
endeavor to accommodate the small businessman and those with close corporation statutes
tend to complicate matters. Id. at 252-68. He therefore proposes a "Partnership Corpora-
tion" statute with suitable provisions, such as notice of the form of the business and re-
quirements for maintaining adequate and separate funds and records to protect the public.
Also, the "Partnership Corporation" would be available only to enterprises of limited size.
See id. at 277-306 for the provisions of the suggested act. Note especially §§ 1, 2, 14, 16, 17
of Kessler's proposed statute.
62. Accord, Note, aupra note 60, at 1196-98.
63. It might be argued that a different approach is required when dealing with af-
filiated concerns under the "piercing" doctrine. An affiliate or affiliated company may be
a corporation that controls or is controlled by another concern, directly or indirectly,
through one or more intermediary companies. Apparently many of the same fators are
used in "piercing" cases whether the affiliates are parent-subsidiary or brother-sister
concerns. 1R. STEVENs and H. HENN, supra note 8, at 375-76. See also N. LATTIN, R. JEN-
NINGS, and R. BUXaAUM, supra note 8, at 155-56; Comment, supra note 6.
64. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1968 § 3, at If, col. 3, and 14f, col. 6 (The number of mergers
rose 25 per cent in 1967 (2,975) and is projected to increase 41 per cent in 1968 (4,200).
See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1968 § 8, at If, col. 1, and 1Of, col. 3 discussing "mini"--con-
glomerates.
65. See H. OLECK, MODNz CORpORATION LAW § 1802 (student ed. 1960) for a straight-
forward enumeration of the major purposes for forming subsidiaries. See also BERLE, aupra
note 9, at 153; LATTY, SuBssDIAaI S AND AFSIIATED C0RponP xoNs (1936) ; Cataldo, Lim-
TED L'I- Lry WrrH ONE-MAN COMPANI58 AND SuBsIIaR CORPORATIONS, 18 LAW &
CONTEMp. PRoB. 473, 487-88 (1953).
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porations all of which concentrate on the same line of business.66
Generally the parent-subsidiary relationship is distinguishable
from the close corporation structure in several respects and there-
fore necessitates a somewhat different approach when employing
the "piercing" doctrine. 67 The most obvious distinction is the po-
tential' dual liability, that is, the parent being responsible for the
subsidiary's contracts and torts and the subsidiary being charged
with the wrongdoing of the parent. Second, the vast majority of
subsidiaries are attached to large parent companies having abun-
dant executive talent and financial resources which filter down to the
sub-unit. Consequently, the likelihood of the subsidiary having
lackadaisical management and inadequate capital is reduced. Third,
with notable exceptions, modern corporation enabling statutes have
been designed to serve the needs of large public corporations. The
statutory prescription of procedures and formalities to be followed
generally precludes management of such concerns operating as
partnerships and thereby attempts to protect both shareholders of
the corporation and its creditors. The potential manipulative prac-
tices Dean Tennery envisions in the "unregulated" close corporation
environment should not exist to the same degree in the parent-
subsidiary relationship even though it is apparent modern corpora-
tion statutes attempt to maximize the freedom of management
decision making and the public shareholder exerts minimal restraint
on management actions. 8 Fourth, the regulatory impact and con-
sequences of state and federal business laws and the development
of a code of corporate ethics by the federal courts and the Securities
and Exchange Commission tend to mitigate the ability of larger
business units and their subsidiaries to undertake activities likely
to result in public harm.6 9 Nonetheless the modicum of cases apply-
ing the doctrine in the parent-subsidiary context affirms that it re-
mains a continuing problem.70
66. See e.g., Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585
(1966).
67. N. LATTrN, R. JENNINGS, and t. BUXEAUM, aupra note 8, at 155 state: "It does not
seem that intercorporate relationships should be subject to different tests of ["piercing"],
despite occastanal suggestions to this end." See discussion in text infra.
68. The separation of control from ownership is commonplace and has caused consider-
able agitation about the modern shareholder's powerlessness. F. EMERsON and F. LATCHAM,
SHAREHOLDER DEMocRAcY: A BROADER OUTLOOK Ml0R CORPORATIONS (1954).
69. Principally these developments have occurred under the federal securities acts;
especially, section 10(b) of the SEcuRrrEs EXCHANGfE ACT of 1934 and Rule lOb-5. Aggres-
sive Securities and Exchange Commission action against the Texas Gulf Sulpher Company
and the brokerage firm of Merrill Lynch, Fenner, Pierce and Smith exemplify this trend.
A higher fiduciary code of conduct is evolving for the business and financial community.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Escott v. BarChris Corp.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. para. 92, 179 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 1968) ; Gary, Corporate Stand-
ard8 and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 408 (1962).
70. E.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States, 395 F.2d 1005 (Ct. Cl. 1968). See 1 W.
FLETCHER, supra note 6. § 43 and collected cases.
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Current Standards
In formulating standards for disregarding corporateness, either
of a close corporation or in the parent-subsidiary affinity, consider-
able similarity exists among the various tests applied to each situ-
ation. In addition, in both situations the courts have fallen victim
to the "mists of metaphor" in explaining the imposition of personal
liability on shareholders for corporate debts.7 1 Also the courts seem
to concur that it is beyond cavil to assert that evidence showing
that incorporation was solely to achieve limited liability is sufficient
to justify puncturing the immunity or even a material factor in
applying the doctrine. 72 This position is both defensible and logical
and the doctrine itself is not usually advanced by a consideration
of this point. The legal and business community have too long accept-
ed limited liability as a corallary to corporateness, and state statutes
and some constitutions expressly grant this benefit. Thus discussion
of this purpose may sometimes be irrelevant to the justice of the
outcome in a particular case.
Rarely is the formulation of criteria for disregarding corporate-
ness sufficiently complete, accurate, or comprehensible. It is the
contention of this article that the doctrine of disregarding corporate-
ness embraces several legal approaches which are always multi-
factor and that the doctrine's continued vitality depends on the
very imprecision which might cause some legal critics to denounce
it.7s
Legislative and judicial authorization for close corporations to
depart from long standing norms of corporate behavior certainly
presage the need for a new, disencumbered approach. The recent
case of Zubik v. Zubik & Sons, Inc., involving the issue of the
imposition of personal liability on a close corporation's major
shareholder in an admiralty action seems to represent the most
common yet realistic approach. 74 The court found it permissible
71. The "mist of metaphor" phrase is that of Judge Cardozo in the well known case of
Brekey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
72. E.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
This case is apparently being relitigated on an amended complaint 287 N.Y.S.2d 546 (App.
Div. 1968).
73. Courts agree by regarding each "piercing" case as distinctive. E.g., Pagel, Horton
& Co. v. Harmon Paper Co., 236 App. Div. 47, 49, 258 N.Y.S. 168, 171 (1932).
74. 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968). In that case, the de-
fendant, for reasons of poor health, formed a corporation in which his two children Were
the other shareholders and principal managers and orally leased his fleet of barges to the
corporation. The evidence in the case presented difficulty in determining whether to apply
the "piercing" doctrine. In favor of the doctrine's application was evidence that the cor-
poration paid defendant's salary and rent to a corporate account and also paid his per
sonal expenses, corporate meetings were not held for several years, only defendant was
empowered to sign corporate checks, defendant loaned money to the corporation, the cor-
poration retained some of his personal papers and defendant enjoyed a veto power over
corporate decisions. Proof precluding application of the doctrine included the fact that
defendant's daughter had a power of attorney to sign corporate checks, the corporation
borrowed funds from other sources and had its own assets, and defendant was not active
in supervising its daily operations. The action arose when some of the corporation's
barges broke their moorings and drifted into other vessels thereby damaging them.
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and understandable for an ill man engaged in a business subject
to the risk of constant litigation to obtain the security of limited
liability when he no longer could actively manage his business.
The test stated is clearly equitable:
[T]he appropriate occasion for disregarding the corpor-
ate existence occurs when the court must prevent fraud,
illegality, or injustice, or when recognition of the . . . entity
would defeat public policy or shield someone from liability
for a crime.
75
Unfortunately, the Court seemed hidebound to the utility of the
separate entity theory but its view that limited liability should not
be lost "unless specific, unusual circumstances call for an exception"
is sound. More significantly the court stated:
Limiting one's personal liability is a traditional reason for
a corporation. Unless done deliberately, with specific intent
to escape liability for a specific tort or class of torts, the
cause of justice does not require disregarding the corporate
entity. The corporate form itself works no fraud on a person
harmed in an accident who has never elected to deal with
the corporation.
Once fraud or injustice demand piercing the corporate veil,
then the intertwining of personal affairs with a family cor-
poration . . . provide additional grounds. . . . [T]he failure
of various corporate formalities either contributes to the
fraud involved or strengthens the argument for injustice by
holding the individual in effect estopped.
76
While the significance of the nature of the claim will be dealt with
subsequently, the broad dimensions given the "piercing" doctrine
in the Zubik case should apply whether or not the claimant's action
is based on a tort or contract. Zubik clearly views the doctrine
as outcome oriented by virtue of its emphasis on balancing the
equities and a multiplex analysis. It recognizes that mixed moti-
vations are involved in incorporating but creates difficult evidentiary
problems by referring to "specific intent.
'" 77
Zubik's formulation of the doctrine in largely equitable terms
as it applies to close corporations (or for that matter a parent-
75. Zubick v. Zubick & Sons, Inc., 384 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 988 (1968) (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 273-74. This language and the Court's presumption favoring recognition of
corporate existence whenever it is challenged create difficulty. Id. at 270 n. 2. Plaintiffs
burden of rebutting this presumption is made more complex by the reasoning that "pierc-
ing
' 
results only on a showing of incorporation with specific intent to avoid specific tort
liabilities. To establish such motivation would be virtually impossible and most courts may
be reluctant to explore this murky area. Inquiring into the defendant's motivation also
seems at odds with the general view that proof of such a primary purpose is not sufficient
for "piercing" the veil. E.g., In re Sheridan's Petition, 226 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
77. See the discussion id.
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subsidiary relation) is probably as precise as is humanly possible.
The case does not contribute to understanding the weight accorded
inadequate capitalization, but this will be explored later. Nor does
it clarify, as it should, the relevance of whether or not corporate
formalities are adhered to in light of the modem view that close
corporation management may correspond to that of a partnership.
In focusing on the mingling of personal affairs with corporate busi-
ness, however, it delineates another factor in determining whether
to "pierce" the close corporation veil. In the close corporation,
management and ownership usually coalesce. But this has never
been thought to permit the participants to conduct personal activi-
ties in the guise of corporate business. When members of the
close corporation do carry on private affairs within the ambit of
the corporate form, that is, where corporate and personal activities
become indistinguishable, a court may impose personal liability
on the shareholders.7 8 This illustrates the point that, even though
it may be permissible to ignore statutory formalities, personal deals
must not be executed so as to make them ostensibly close corporation
transactions.
In the parent-subsidiary relationship the courts have been freer
in using labels to analyze the propriety of applying the "piercing"
doctrine.7 9 But in this relationship the multi-element analysis seems
to predominate. An excellent illustration of his approach is
Palmer v. Stokely wherein the court, paying homage to the meta-
phor, deemed the subsidiary "a mere instrumentality" of the par-
ent if:
(1) the parent owns all the stock; (2) both have common
directors and officers; (3) the parent finances the subsidi-
ary; (4) the parent causes the subsidiary's incorporation;
78. E.g., Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552 (Conn. 1967); African Metals Corp. v. Bullowa,
288 N.Y. 78, 41 N.E.2d 466 (1942) ; Natelson v. A.B.L. Holding Co., 260 N.Y. 233, 183 N.E.
373 (1932). 1 F. O'NEAL, CLosE CORPoRATiONs § 1.10, 31-32 (Supp. 1968) would subsume
this element of the "piercing" doctrine under that category of cases which "focuses on the
dominant or sole shareholder's control of the corporation." This category, of close corpora-
tion "piercing" cases usually involves (1) control of all or most aspects of the business;
(2) the use of such control to commit a fraud, violate a law, or perpetrate a dishonest
act; and (3) a casual relation between the wrong and control. Whether viewed as a mat-
ter of dominance or using the close corporation as camouflage for individual business ac-
tivities the factor has confused some courts. E.g., Zaist v. Olson, id. (applied an "instru-
mentality" rule to show defendant conducted the business as an individual) ; Walkovszoky
,v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966) (referred to the agency
concept-which term makes sense only when applied to inter-corporate relations--in find-
ing no evidence defendants were doing business as individuals). Both these cases im-
properly use labels in emphasizing dominance over corporate affairs to determine whether
close corporation participants were actually doing business in their individual capacities.
Tlhe preeminence of private affairs in the close corporation is more clearly shown by proof
of manipulation of funds for the participants' personal convenience. Mull v. Colt Co., 31
F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The lesson is to eschew labels and recognize that while share-
holder dominance may be more important to the contract creditor than tort creditor it is
generally unrelated to the specific harm. Proof of inadequate corporate funds attributable
to poor business planning, deliberately diverting funds, or infusing and withdrawing money
for personal advantage is far more important to creditors.
79. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co.. 244 N.Y. 84. 155 N.E. 58 (1926).
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(5) the subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital; (6) the
parent pays salaries or expenses of the subsidiary; (7) the
subsidiary has no business except with its parent or subsidi-
ary corporation or no assets except those transferred by its
parent or subsidiary; (8) directors and officers do not act
independently in the interests of the subsidiary; (9) formal
legal requirements of the subsidiary such as keeping cor-
porate minutes are not observed; (10) distinctions between
the parent and subsidiary and subsidiary and its subsidiary
are disregarded or confused; (11) subsidiaries do not have
full board of directors.8 0
What the court is actually concerned with is the control or power
relation between the corporations which must be so overwhelming
and pervasive that one is the "dependent" of the other and therefore
liable for the "dependent's" wrongs. Another court, dissecting the
parent-subsidiary relationship, held that the factors enumerated in
the Palmer case determine when the parent possesses the proper
degree of control to make the subsidiary an"instrumentality," but
required that two other tests be satisfied simultaneously; namely,
the parent must perpetrate a misdeed through the sub-unit and
the claimant must suffer unfair damage before the imposition of
liability on the parent concern."'
The control aspect of the parent-subsidiary relation has its coun-
terpart in the close corporation context where the court considers
the dominance of certain members over the corporation's affairs
in deciding whether to preserve the corporate entity.8 2 But other-
wise it becomes important primarily in terms of intercorporate
dealings and the question of the parent corporation's liability for
the subsidiary's actions. It is not disconcerting in the parent-sub-
sidiary relation to find the court stressing control in examining the
corporate interconnection and holding the subsidiary a "mere de-
partment, agent or instrumentality." However, it does not seem
particularly constructive for a court to search for the existence of
an agency or other labelled relation, although the court may find
such a characterization helpful because of its familiarity. Instead,
most courts properly focus initially on the extent to which the
parent in reality dominates or controls the subsidiary thereby al-
lowing it to achieve advantages unfairly affecting the creditor's
80. 255 F. Supp. 674, 681 (W.D. Okla. 1966). Accord. Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th
Cir. 1940).
81. Stevene v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1963).
See also Lang v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 266 F. Supp. 552, 558 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Zalst v.
Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 558 (Conn. 1967). This approach is shared by writers. E.g., H. HENN.
supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; H. Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from Lia-
bUilty Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 196-97 (1929); Cataldo, 8upra
note 65, at 488-92; Comment, Alternative Methods of Piercing the Corporate Veil in Con-
tract and Tort Cases, 48 B JU.L. REv. 123 (1968).
82. See discussion supra note 78 involving close corporations.
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interests.18 It is at this point the major substantive legal problem
arises in respect of the requisite degree of parental corporate control.
The courts can enumerate eleven separate factors for determining
the control question, but cannot, and generally do not, resolve
whether all the factors or only particular factors need be present.
The courts have neither ranked the factors in general or in given
fact situations nor indicated whether certain combinations are
more significant than other groupings. Plainly each case must turn
on its peculiar facts because establishing a hierarchy of factors or
preferred combinations for different parent-subsidiary relationships
would be futile. 4 It seems reasonable to conclude that courts
will not generally require the presence of all the factors in any
case and that two of the factors are of great prominence in pro-
tecting the parent concern. There should be a showing of a sub-
stantial degree of independence of identity, internal management
and routine business activities between the parent and subsidiary
and the subsidiary must have an adequate financial structure.
85
Also, in contrast to the close corporation, it is evident adhering to
corporate norms and formalities will always be a material factor
in applying the "piercing" doctrine to the parent-subsidiary relation.
In addition to applying the doctrine on the basis of tests formu-
lated in vague equitable terms, or using metaphoric labels, or
statements of manifold criteria, or dominance or control theories,
or hackneyed propositions dealing with the separate entity notion
and observance of corporate norms, one other proposal, Professor
Berle's enterprise entity concept, deserves mention.86 Professor
Berle's theory of defining the enterprise in economic terms is rele-
vant to cases involving multiple close corporations engaged in an
identical or similar business under common ownership or control
as well as to parent-subsidiary problems. For example in Mull v.
Colt Co., Inc. in which a tort claimant sued an enterprise consisting
of one hundred corporations owning two taxicabs, the Court noted:
[P]laintiff has joined . . . this complex, seeking to pierce
the corporate veil for the purpose of holding the entire eco-
nomic entity liable.
83. See N. LATlrlI, !-. JENNINGS, and B- BUXBAUM supra note 8, at 154-56 for an inter-
esting discussion of the relevance of dominance. Complete or substantial dominance is not
sufficient itself for "piercing" the corporate veiL
84. This seems beyond dispute when one considers that affiliates can be parent-sub-
sidiary or brother-sister corporations and that the possible shades of intertwining are
many. See Comment, supra note 6, at 1181-33.
85. RE. STEVENS and H. HENN, supra note 8, at 375 state that the factors most frequent-
ly considered are: degree of financial ownership; domination of the sub-unit's affairs;
whether the sub-unit was organized or acquired; its financial condition; and, the "sep-
arateness" of the companies. 1 P. O'NAX., supra note 78 § 1.10, 32 (Supp. 1968) suggests
similar considerations to protect the close corporation shareholder.
86. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947).
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If plaintiff can show that there was such a unity of interest
and ownership that the independence of the corporations
had in effect ceased or had never begun, an adherence to
the fiction of separate identity would . . . [permit]
the economic entity to escape liability arising out of an
operation conducted by one corporation for the benefit of
the whole enterprise.
7
Berle's proposal clearly merits consideration respecting the parent-
subsidiary relation as American business companies continually en-
large and decentralize by a process of creating sub-units.
More often than not, a single large-scale business is con-
ducted, not by a single corporation, but by a constellation
of corporations controlled by a central holding company,
the various sections being separately incorporated . . .I
He suggests such multiple corporations contravene the traditional
idea of a corporation and that the "real" enterprise should be
defined by the underlying economic facts. This theory is regarded
as a means of systematizing the many "rough edges" of corporate
law by recognizing the "corporation is emerging as an enterprise
bounded by economics, rather than as an artificial mystic per-
sonality bounded by forms of words... ."89
In discussing the doctrine of disregarding corporateness Berle
observes:
The fragile quality of the legal personality created by a
corporation is aptly demonstrated. When the corporate
fiction is disregarded, an actual underlying enterprise entity
may be made to appear. The cases . . . which disregard the
corporate fiction . . . seem to stem from the same prin-
ciple. ....
[I]t is always open to inquiry whether the enterprise-fact
corresponds to the corporate-fact...
If it be shown that the enterprise is not reflected and com-
87. 31 F.R.D. 154, 157, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (emphasis added). The Court also men-
tioned three bases for "piercing" the corporate veil: where fraud or Illegality Is present;
where the corporation is an agent; and, where business is conduced as indl iduals. Id. at
160, Its analysis is not edifying, See also Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d
6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966), also involving ownership of a taxicab fleet in ten small cor-
Porations). The majority opinion noted that there is a difference between contending
that the corporation is a "fragment" of a larger enterprise which runs the business and
that the corporation is a "dumnry" for the shareholders to operate the business "in their
personal capacities for purely personal rather than corporate ends." In either instance, ac-
cording to the majority, the corporation may be an "agent" and the "piercing" doctrine
would apply but with different results. In the former situation the entire enterprise would
be liable, but in the latter only the shareholders could be reached.
.88. Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947).
89. Id. at 345.
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prehended by the corporate papers, books and operation,
the court may reconstruct the actual enterprise, giving
entity to it, based on the economic facts.90
Berle's analysis has a logical appeal in certain cases but it does
not obviate the need for a multi-factor approach in deciding whether
to deny immunity to the shareholders. Moreover, courts generally
do not appear to have adopted Berle's theory unless one cares to
equate it with the metaphors "agency, adjuncts, instrumentality, or
department." 91 The enterprise entity approach also raises difficult
questions as to what "economic facts" delimit the enterprise
involved.
One of the most compelling factors, applicable to all types of
corporations, in judging whether or not to retain limited liability
is that of the adequacy of the capitalization of the enterprise.9 2
There are no meaningful statutory guidelines in this matter and
courts are left to their own ingenuity in developing the content and
significance of this element. Questions pertaining to the weight to
be given this factor in applying the doctrine, what inadequate capi-
talization means for different types of corporations and with respect
to different claimants, and whether the question of inadequacy is
to be ascertained at the time of incorporation or the injury remain
largely unanswered. However, some light can be shed.
No court has yet been willing to hold that inadequate capitaliza-
tion alone is a sufficient ground to disregard corporateness, but it
is becoming a material factor in every conceivable case where
the defense of limited liability may be challenged. 93 It is doubtful
that inadequate capitalization will ever achieve the status of a
sufficient, independent legal ground for applying the doctrine but
its increasing importance is inexorable. 9 4 The factor is troublesome
to many courts because they have never really considered it or
it has been submerged in the multi-factor approach of the doctrine.
Courts are also hard pressed to indicate what they actually mean
by inadequate capitalization in the absence of predetermined statu-
tory or legal standards and perhaps the paucity of economic evidence
90. Id. at 352, 354.
91. While Berle's "enterprise entity" theory lacks explicit Judicial approval it has In-
fluenced some decisions. See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 155 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1946) ;
Hartford Steam Serv. Co., 220 A.2d 772 (Conn. 1966); Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons
Farms, 146 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1958) ; Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 26
N.J. 229, 139 A.2d 281 (1958) ; and cases cited supra note 87.
92. See, e.g., N. L&T'riN, R. JEN~rNOs, and R. BUXRAUM, supra note 8, at 375. 1 F.
O'NEAL, Supra note 78, at § 1.10, notes the pervasiveness of undercapitalization where lia-
bility is imposed under the "piercing" doctrine. The problem of undercapitalization in
such cases is not to be confused with "thin" capitalization controversies under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code where the issue is whether a security represents debt or equity. See
Comment, Thin Incorporation: A Continuing Problem, 51 MAnQ. L. 1l-v. 158 (1968).
93. See e.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Mull v. Colt
Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
94. Oee e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576 364, P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961)
Annot. 63 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1958).
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and evaluation in the individual cases. Moreover, the factor lends
itself to sensible utilization only in the setting of a given case which
excludes arbitrary advance formulations or statements concerning
it. The significant point is that courts now grasp the conflict and
connection between inadequate capitalization and the privilege of
limited liability assigned to separate corporate existence:
Where it is sought . . . to make available to . . . creditors
only an illusory amount compared with the size of the busi-
ness and [its inherent] public responsibility . . . it would
be gross inequity to allow such a flimsy organization to
provide a shield for personal liability. Courts will not tolerate
arrangements which throw all risks on the public and which
enable shareholders to reap profits while being insulated
against losses. e5
Courts and writers realize that investors have an obligation to
avoid undercapitalization which might cause losses to present or
prospective corporate creditors. Capitalization must be commen-
surate with the nature, extent and conduct of the business which
suggests it will not be regarded as a static factor in a situation
of expanding or contracting economic conditions. The doctrine of
disregarding corporateness should embody the policy that "share-
holders should in good faith put at the risk of the business unencum-
bered capital reasonably adequate for its prospective liabilities."96
Dewing has noted the divergent usages of the term capital by ac-
countants, businessmen and lawyers, but observes that investors
of the profit seeking corporation in order to achieve this end" . . .
must first endow [it] with adequate economic resources. ' 97 To
avert the drastic consequences of undercapitalization, organizers,
promotors and investors must undertake careful, sophisticated
financial planning and forecasting at the time of incorporation and
thereafter engage in periodic evaluations of probable financial needs
and contingencies. Such planning is habitual for large companies,
but the likelihood of this practice may progressively diminish with
the size of the business enterprise.9 8
The obligation to provide adequate risk capital begins with
incorporation and is a continuing obligation thereafter if the inves-
tors are to be permitted to remain free from personal responsi-
95. Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also Dix, Adequate
Risk Capital: The Consideration for the Benefits of Separate Incorporation, 53 Nw. U.L.
REv. 478, 483-84, 492-94 (1958).
96. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 6, at 303.
97. 1 A. DEWING, supra note 14, at 44.
98. Evidence that financial advice and planning can help to forestall adverse conse-
quences is found in Obre v. Alban Tractor Co., 228 Md. 291, 179 A.2d 861 (1962)
(plan for incorporation prepared with assistance of certified public accountants).
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bility. 9 Proper capitalization might be envisioned as the principal
prerequisite for the insulation of limited liability. Yet this qualified
immunity is apparently not enough for some:
Promoters and dominant, managing and controlling stock-
holders have not always been satisfied to take even the
limited risk. . . . They have sought to make available to
general creditors . . . only an amount which is either illusory
or trifling compared with the business to be done, while they
advance the capital really necessary for the business in
the capacity of creditors. In other words, they seek immunity
without providing any fund to which creditors may resort.
Such a practice will not insulate them from liability for
the corporation's debts. 100
This sort of financial contribution is characterized as "defi-
ciency capital" which precludes the contributor from participating
equally in the assets of the company with the public creditors. This
raises another difficult question in denying limited liability. What
of the ordinary shareholder who merely purchases shares of stock,
but is neither a controlling or dominant security holder nor active
in management, in the event the court deems the business under-
capitalized? If personal liability is to be imposed for corporate
debts should it include a shareholder who lacks an effective voice
or significant influence in management or who has little or no
knowledge of corporate business and actions? 011 It appears that most
shareholders who incur personal liability for corporate debts do
not fit into this category. The problem is more speculative in the
typical close corporation where the members will normally be
active participants, but it becomes involuted in more widely held
companies where there is a gulf between ownership and manage-
ment.
Guidelines to ascertain the adequacy of capitalization are neces-
sarily imprecise and complex. What is required is a process of fi-
nancial and economic analysis in each case. One fact stands out;
the juxtaposition of capitalization and limited liability affirms the
former's overriding importance.
99. Dix, supra note 95, at 491.
100. Dix, supra note 95, at 491-92.
101. Usually this problem is not directly posed where the parent is charged with the
subsidiary's acts or a publicly owned company is involved. There is an analogy in cases
determining the liability of members of an association in which defective incorporation
precludes use of the now largely passe "de facto" corporation doctrine. Partnership lia-
bility may not be imposed on passive members. See R. BAKSR and W. CARY, supra note 8,
at 60-61, 64-65. In several recent decisions there is some indication that failure to actively
participate in the affairs of a close corporation will afford some protection against the
"piercing" doctrine. Zubik v. Zubik & Sons, Inc., aupra note 75; Walkovszky v. Carlton,
18 N.Y.2d 414, 233 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966) (Keating, 3. dissenting) ; Minton v.
Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 3641 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
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Where risk capital is inadequate, either because initial
capitalization was insufficient or because the risk capital
subsequently became impaired from any cause, including
business adversity, that deficiency must be cured or the
business wound up. If the business continues operation with
uncured impairment, its obligations will . . . [infect]
stockholders personally.
10 2
B. The Nature of the Claim
Claims against the corporation assertedly justifying the imposi-
tion of personal liability on shareholders will stem from tortious
conduct or breach of contract. The different nature of these actions
and the varied interests of the claimants demand inquiry whether
or not different analysis in disregarding corporateness is required
and whether certain interests adversely affected merit more sym-
pathetic consideration in one case than the other. An affirmative
response to both questions seems in order. The need for disparate
approaches in this area is suggested by language in Zubik:
Cases in bankruptcy or in taxation call for an entirely dif-
ferent evaluation of 'fraud' or 'injustice' than cases of con-
trolled corporate subsidiaries, or as in this instance, a case
of corporate tort. The defrauded creditor or 'victim' of a
business transaction with an undercapitalized corporation,
for instance, often has a strong case for piercing the veil
of a 'sham' corporation. The controversy in such cases in-
variably involves some degree of reliance by the plaintiff,
contributing to the fraud, or undue advantage or trick accent-
ing the injustice. But the injured tort claimant stands on a
different footing.10
It should be reiterated that the problem is most severe with respect
to inadequately capitalized close corporations where the amount of
the claim exceeds the corporation's assets. Rarely will the tort or
contract claimant need to attack the limited liability of shareholders
of medium and large corporations enjoying competent management,
abundant risk capital and employing other risk absorbing or spread-
ing mechanisms (insurance, special reserves etc.).
102. Dix, supra note 95, at 494.
103. Zublk v. Zubik & Sons, Inc., aupra note 75, at 273. Writers more often than courts
see the need to view contract and tort claims differently under the "piercing" doctrine.
See e.g., Cataldo, supra note 65, at 475-78; Comment supra note 81, at 134-40; Note,
upra note 60, at 1192-96. The applicability of the "piercing" doctrine also may be in-
fluenced by the type of case presented ; such as bankruptcy, taxation, attempt to defeat
an express public policy, violation of a penal statute, or the shareholder seeking to disre-
gard the entity for his own benefit. Bee 1. STEvENs and M. HENN, aupra note 8, at 377-400
(breakdown of "piercing" cases by type) ; 1 W. FLETCHER, 8upra note 6 §§ 34, 37, 39, 44,
45, 45.1, 45.2. The breadth of the doctrine includes international law problems. Note, Pierc-
ing the Corporate Veil Under International Law, 16 SYRAcusE L. REv. 779 (1965). This ar-
ticle does not try to review the specific types of cases except from the standpoint of the
nature of the creditor, but it should be recognized different standards of fraud arise in
these cases thereby affecting the determination of whether to "pierce" the corporate veil.
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What distinction ought to be made concerning the relationship
of the corporation to each type of claim and the claimant's ex-
pectations? In the case of contract creditors, analysis centers on
the existence of a consensual relation with a business or individual,
evidence relating to a particular commercial transaction, and the
creditor's reliance on the fact of corporateness and segregated as-
sets or the absence of any appearance or representation of cor-
porateness.
The obligee of a contractual obligation has an opportunity
of knowing and choosing his obligor. He should know with
whom he is dealing and should be bound by his choice. If
insolvency overtakes the sole shareholder, or the corporation,
or both, it is necessary to weigh the respective positions of
those who dealt with the business on a corporate basis and
those who dealt with the sole shareholder as an individual.
The equities of the former are no greater than those of the
latter. The former will be limited to the corporate assets;
the latter to the individual assets. By this marshalling, the
equal equities of both groups are preserved, in the usual
and ordinary case.
0 4
In outlining standards for disregarding corporateness on behalf of
contract claimants the focal point of courts should become criteria
which recognize the injured party's reliance on the existence of
the corporate form and its presumed assets or the defendant's rep-
resentations or other evidence of lack of corporateness thereby mis-
leading the complainant. 10 5 Apart from general equitable considera-
tions underlying the doctrine, several criteria should assume
importance. If there is evidence of a corporation then factors such
as conforming to corporate norms, not intermingling personal and
business transactions and ample capital may be associated with
the creditor's reliance. If the defendant in the transaction has
excluded any appearance of corporateness or appearances are at
best ambiguous it is entirely consistent with the equitable nature
of the doctrine to disallow interposition of the protection of limited
liability. To do so otherwise would be tantamount to constructive
fraud. In instances in which the defendant's conduct is fraudulent,
as where he has diverted corporate assets to his personal use, or
is illegal or violative of public policy, the reasons are even more
cogent for preventing the separate entity from defeating reasonably
aroused expectations in the creditor and frustrating or contradicting
104. Cataldo, supra note 65, at 476.
105. State corporation statutes are intended to afford business creditors some protection.
Garrett, Capital and Surplus Under the New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROn. 239 (1958). But a business creditor also may rely on other factors in dealing with
a company such as its general reputation, ratings by credit agencies, its top echelon execu-
tives and previous transactions.
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the otherwise legitimate policy basis of limited liability. The judicial
standards utilized regarding contract creditors ought to reflect
their reliance on corporateness or victimization as the result of
deception implying the nonexistence of a company.
Cursory examination would suggest tort claimants should stand
on a different footing when compared to contract creditors in this
area. 1 6 Yet the analysis of the courts faced with the "piercing"
question scarcely seems to recognize the validity of this difference. 1'0
Tort liability, in contrast to a contractual obligation, usually arises
from a nonconsensual transaction in which the party harmed does
not rely on the presence or absence of the corporate form or assets
or the lack of indicia of corporateness. Indeed, the corporation,
management and shareholders are probably unknown to the tort
claimant. Furthermore, unbeknownst to the tort claimant the prin-
cipal reason for incorporation may have been to escape the very
risks the claimant represents. Unlike the case of the contract
creditor the court should not consider the absence of any relationship
between the corporation and injured party. But as noted in Zubik:
The corporate form itself works no fraud on a person harmed
in an accident who has never elected to deal with the
corporation.
Nowhere does it appear that anyone failed to insure or felt
protected in reliance upon Zubik Corporation's assets. 1 8
From the previous discussion of standards for disregarding cor-
porateness it should appear a court may be eclectic and flexible
in its approach if it chooses. If so what should its approach be
toward tort claimants?
When dealing with a tort claimant it seems fatuous for the
court to dwell at any length on the legitimacy of organizing to
achieve insulation or whether or not the corporate rites have been
scrupulously followed, especially respecting close corporations. 10 9
Otherwise such rigid adherence to formalities might spell unbreach-
106. See e.g., Comment, supra note 81, at 194-40; Note, supra note 60, at 1192-96.
107. Compare Wakovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585
(1966) wtfh Zubik v. Zubik & Sons, Inc., supra note 75. See N. LATTIN, IL JENNINGS and
R. BuxBAUm, aupra note 8, at 156-57.
108. Zubik v. Zubik & Sons, Inc., aupra note 75, at 273-74. This language seems incon-
gruous with the court's reasoning that the corporate veil may be "pierced" where the busi-
ness was formed with the specific intent to escape specific torts. Conceivably Incorporation
for the sole purpose of avoiding personal liability arising from a prospective tort or con-
tract claim could be said to work a fraud on the claimant before he has any contact with
the company. See the discussion aupra note 76.
109. As noted, statutory recognition of the privilege of limited liability and the onerous
burden of establishing the prime motivation make such an inquiry impractical. Further,
nonobservance of corporate formalities may be condoned as an insufficient ground for
"piercing." E.g., Contractors Heating and Supply Co. v. Scherb, 432 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1967);
Galler v. Galler, 32 11l.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
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able limited liability on the part of shareholders for corporate torts.
This is inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the "piercing"
rationale and fails to acknowledge that the claimant is adventi-
tiously related to the tortfeasor corporation. If it is possible to
devise different standards for the tort claimant, account must be
taken of the difficult evidentiary problems confronting him. For
example, requiring proof that the business in reality operates
as a partnership is obviously burdensome to the party concerned
only with adequate compensation. Indeed such a burden might sur-
pass that of the contract creditor which could involve merely a
single commercial transaction. 110 It might also be argued that it
is irrelevant whether the defendant shareholder or parent company
dominated the wrongdoer corporation or intermixed his affairs with
the company's because the tort claimant neither knows nor relies
on these matters."1 While these factors may not be the proximate
cause of the claimant's loss or injury they probably will remain
relevant considerations because such pervasive control denotes a
measure of responsibility for the concern's actions.1 2 Perhaps a
judicial approach which minimizes the tort claimant's burden of
proof in "piercing" the corporate veil and maximizes realization
of the compensatory, deterrent, and punitive goals of tort liability
should be developed."13 This makes some sense if one is prepared
to accept the premise tort losses are a normal business risk and
denying limited liability is the most effective means of spreading
and absorbing the individual's damage. Depending on one's value
system or order of social priorities it is also arguable that the tort
claimant should receive more sympathetic treatment than the con-
tract creditor. This implies an easier, more accommodating ap-
proach in disregarding corporateness on the part of courts.
The fact of inadequate corporate resources to redress tort vic-
tims would seem to suggest that undercapitalization is the most
important factor in regard to tort claimants (if not for creditors
generally) ." Recent tort-piercing cases tend to reinforce this im-
pression." 5 The growing significance of this factor would obtain
whether the tort was attributable to a close corporation or a
subsidiary company. As noted, three formidable barriers generally
110. Note, supra note 60, at 1193.
111. Comment, supra note 81, at 136.
112. 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 78, at 32, n. 72.06 (Supp. 1968).
113. See note, supra note 60, at 1195. Courts will be reluctant to implement this propo-
sition. Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
114. This is hardly an original conclusion but it has received urgent emphasis in recent
literature on "piercing." Comment, supra note 81, at 138-41; Note, 8upra note 60, at
1193-94.
115. E.g., Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ; Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d
576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961). 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 78, at 32, n. 72.09
(Supp. 1968). These cases all involve close corporations.
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exist to the predominance of this factor in the "piercing" cases.116
Some courts have not explored it as a factor at all while others
treat it only lightly. As a factor, undercapitalization is just that
and no more. Courts consider it, some perhaps more heavily than
other elements, but do not appear prepared to regard it as dis-
positive of the question of accountability for a particular type of
claim. 1" Definitional problems permeate the concept of undercapi-
talization." 8 Corporation enabling statutes offer no guideposts so
courts are left to their own devices. Does sufficient capitalization
relate to the portion of assets constituting shareholder equity or
include corporate assets in their entirety?1 9 The requisite amount
of financial resources should fluctuate according to the scope and
nature of the corporation's business activities and its predictable
adverse impact on the general public.120 Most courts are probably
prone to judge the adequacy of a particular corporation's capital
structure largely on the basis of its present and foreseeable business
purposes and activities. This may not be the same as evaluating
capitalization from the viewpoint of the potential risks to the public
resulting from the corporation's activities. An expanded judicial
vision of adequate capitalization is required.
1 2
1
Inextricably linked to the question of adequate capitalization is
the extent of control and prudence exercised in managing the af-
fairs of the corporation, particularly close corporations, by the affect-
ed shareholders. 22 Personal liability will not, and should not, flow
merely on the ground that an internal management structure re-
116. See Comment, supra note 81 at 138-41; Note, supra note 60, at 1193-94.
117. Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). What is more surprising is that
no commentator expressly proposes, especially In tort cases, that Inadequate capitalization
be held a substantive ground for "piercing." Perhaps this is unworkable in the absence of
agreement on what adequate capitalization should mean. An argument can certainly be
made for the need for legislative action to fill the void.
118. N. LAT'IN, R. JENNInas and R. BuXBAUM, supra note 8, at 152-53.
119. Note, supra note 60, at 1194 and cases cited therein.
120. This seems to be the view in Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
where the Court measures the adequacy of capitalization in terms of the business' "pros-
pective liabilities" and the "public responsibility inherent in its very nature." The latter
point saems to emphasize the potential hazards to other parties arising from the character
of the operations of the business.
121. Comment, supra note 81, at 188-41 declares that the notion of adequate capitaliza-
tion must cover possible tort victims. The writer would require the tort claimant to show
that the shareholder "so dominated his corporation as to make It his Instrument" and
that capitalization is Inadequate by the standard enunciated in Walkovszky v. Carlton, 13
N.Y.2d 414, 426, 223 N.E.2d 6, 13, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 594 (1966). (Keating, J. dissenting).
Two criticisms may be directed at this test. The term "dominance" seems to exclude other
shareholders who may participate in close corporation decisions. What happens if a single
shareholder does not control the business? The label "instrument" is unhelpful. Possibly
dominance ought to mean shareholder-officers who are responsible for "the operational
policies giving rise to the tort" and who fail to "accumulate sufficient assets or insurance
to satisfy the tort judgment." See Note, su4ra note 60, at 1195. Judge Keating's statement
that a corporation "vested with a public interest" must possess resources commensurate
with liabilities rising in the ordinary course of business adds confusion, rather than clar-
ity, in assessing the adequacy of a business' assets. There can be no disagreement, how-
ever, that adequacy of capitalization is to be Judged at the time of the wrong. Comment
id. at 189.
122. Tennery, supra note 54; Note, supra note 60, at 1195. See also 1 F. O'NEAL, supra
note 78, at 81-82.
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sembling that of a partnership exists. However, the ability under
the newer close corporation statutes to transfer management control
and authority to the participants would seem to increase the prospect
of attributing the tort directly to their carelessness and neglect
in managing the concern. As far as the close corporation is con-
cerned it is arguable courts should respond to this new power of
members to direct the course of the corporation by imposing a
more stringent precondition to preserve limited liability in the
form of a higher duty of diligence in planning, capitalizing, man-
aging, and securing risk spreading devices.
Contemporary legal standards for disregarding corporateness
are often deficient in failing to distinguish the different interests
and problems of tort creditors and contract creditors. But designing
new judicial criteria to protect the legitimate interests of each type
of claimant is not an easy task. The reconciliation of the claimant's
interests with the premises and statutory policy supporting limited
liability is a major obstacle. If one assumes that the privilege of
limited liability for shareholders must yield to creditors otherwise
forced to carry unanticipated losses, then the courts will have
to readjust their thinking, especially in relation to close corporations.
The twin concepts of the separate corporate entity and limited
liability must be critically re-examined and presumably deemed
less sacrosanct by the courts. This reassessment is made the more
difficult by uncertainty concerning its economic consequences. Even
should courts be unwilling to do this they surely can revise their
view on capitalization so as to measure its adequacy in terms of
actual and potential liabilities to the public rather than merely the
corporation's business needs.
C. The Subordination of Creditor's Claim Rationale
In an effort to ascertain whether or not contemporary judicial
tests for disregarding corporateness can be clarified, improved upon,
or superseded by borrowing from other corporate law sources it
is necessary to examine an allied area; that of reorganization, re-
ceivership, or bankruptcy proceedings in which the corporate credi-
tor strives to prevent a parent corporation or dominant shareholder
or executive from participating on a parity with him in the insolvent
concern's assets on the ground it would be inequitable to do so.2 8
Here the converse of the piercing situation is involved-no attempt
is made to judicially negate limited liability. This subordination
of claims process, based on the unfairness surrounding the cre-
ation of an authentic claim or the finding that the indebtedness
123. R. STEvzNs and H. HENN, aisra note 8, at 394 articulate this as a possible ap-
proach.
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is fictitious or a sham, is known to most as the Deep Rock doctrine,
but that phrase will not be used now because of the professional
wrath it has produced and its legal quiescence in recent years.
124
The equitable practice of subordinating "inside" creditors'
claims has been applied to single companies and the parent-subsidi-
ary relation. The subordination principle was first applied in a
parent-subsidiary context by the United States Supreme Court to a
corporate reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act.125 The Court
declared:
Petitioners invoke the so-called instrumentality rule,-under
which, they say, Deep Rock is to be regarded as a depart-
ment or agent of Standard,-to preclude the allowance of
Standard's claim in any amount. The rule . . . is not, prop-
erly speaking, a rule, but a convenient way of designating
the application in particular circumstances of the broader
equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity,
recognized generally and for most purposes, will not be
regarded when so to do would work fraud or injustice.
126
In the same year the Supreme Court applied the principle to the
claim of a controlling shareholder in Pepper v. Litton, noting that,
as a bankruptcy court, the federal district court's equitable powers
included the rejection of claims in whole or in part "according to
the equities of the case."' 27 The Court observed
[T]hat equitable power also exists in passing on claims
by an officer, director, or stockholder. . . . [D]isallowance
or subordination may be necessitated by certain cardinal
principles of equity jurisprudence. . . . [T]he entire com-
munity of interests in the corporation [is involved]-cre-
ditors as well as stockholders ...
In the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction the bankruptcy
court has the power to sift the circumstances surrounding
any claim to see that injustice and unfairness is not
done. 128
Later came the Court's most significant language:
But in that situation [when the order of payment of claims
was not in question but disallowance of a claim as a fabri-
cation by holding the debtor concern the stockholder's
own enterprise, consistently with the course of conduct of
the stockholder] as well as in the others . . . a sufficient
124. Stroja, Deep Rock-A Post Mortem, 34 U. Dur. L.J. 279 (1957).
125. Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
126. Id. at 322 (emphaais added).
127. 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939).
128. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-08.
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consideration may be simply the violation of rules of fair
play and good conscience. . . . He [a corporate fiduciary]
cannot by the use of the corporate device avail himself of
privileges normally permitted outsiders in a race of credi-
tors. . . . He cannot violate rules of fair play by doing indi-
rectly through the corporation what he could not do directly.
He cannot use his power . . . to the detriment of...
creditors no matter how absolute . . . and no matter how
meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements.
12 9
A close reading of these two cases does not disclose whether
the court simply embellished the "piercing" doctrine or replaced
it with a new, flexible tool of equity. Henn seems to conclude that
the upshot of the subordination cases is to cancel the use of an
"instrumentality" doctrine and substitute a "new standard based
upon fairness and the equities of the case."'31 0 The main advantage
of shifting to a "fundamental fairness" approach presumably is to
avoid a possible judicial "hang up" with the separate entity concept
and to permit the court to focus primarily on competing interests
without being sidetracked by matters of form.
Henn's statement compels one to ask whether or not he properly
construed the cases, and, if so, whether the principle, as stated,
is a workable substitute for or at all helpful in illuminating the
"piercing" doctrine as now conceived. The scope and meaning of
the principle of subordinating debt claims certainly cannot be
gleaned from the two Supreme Court decisions, one of which in-
volved a parent which misused a subsidiary for its own enrichment
(the instrumentality idea) and the other which involved a share-
holder-officer who violated his fiduciary duty in dealing with the
company (thus freighting a bankruptcy case with even greater
equitable considerations). However, the language of the Court in
Pepper v. Litton and the fact a federal bankruptcy court sits as a
court of equity indirectly support Henn's position. Yet distortion
can only be averted if the favored treatment usually accorded credi-
tors is remembered. Israels tentatively read the doctrine as re-
quiring inadequate capital from the outset and mismanagement or
management for personal advantage or interest." 1 More importantly
the doctrine failed to indicate "what the extent of the duty to pro-
vide adequate capital may be. ' 1 3 2 Israels speaks in terms of a
doctrine which arose from an "exploitive" situation but is uncertain
whether or not it is "a new remedy for a recognized fact pattern"
129. Id. at 310-11.
130. H. HENN, supra note 6, at 212. Reference to "instrumentality," If useful at all,
should pertain only to the parent-subsidiary relation.
131. Israels, The Implications of the "Deep Rock" Dootrine, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 376, 379
(1942).
132. Id. at 383.
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or a "new substantive right." 183 Even his multi-factor analysis does
not yield a definitive answer except to underscore the interrelation
of adequate capital and protection of the public interest. On the
other hand, the doctrine has been called "one of the milestones of
parent-subsidiary law. ' 13 4 But this description of the scope of the
doctrine's applicability is too narrow. It resembles the "piercing"
cases in that the problem in both takes the form, albeit not identical,
of competition for corporate assets. In both situations, on the basis
of the equities of each case, "insiders" seek to maintain a favored
position to the detriment of outside creditors. Outside interests pre-
vail only when the "insider's" actions are contrary to established
equitable principles.
One writer properly considers the doctrine of equitable subordi-
nation of claims as a multi-factor problem requiring appraisal of
such matters as inadequate financing, the siphoning off of corporate
resources, a general predisposition to ignore the interests of credi-
tors and stockholders and various degrees of corporate mismanage-
ment.18 5 This is of course similar to the current approach of courts
in disregarding corporateness. It is suggested that inadequate capi-
talization is "of itself, sufficient to warrant subordination" whether
it is present at the inception of corporate life or arises thereafter
because of management's decision to expand without enough equity
financing. 18 Both situations "require analysis of venture capital
needs of comparable soundly financed organizations." The proposi-
tion is offered that subordination of a claim may occur in the absence
of evidence of mismanagement, a position of considerable logic
in light of the informal operations of close corporations, when the
company lacks adequate security to protect outside creditors.
Arnold v. Phillips illustrates this point where a creditor's obligation
was construed in equity to be venture capital because it had
been advanced in the face of foreseeable financial adversity.1 " The
impact of this case cannot be overlooked in determining whether
to preserve limited liability.
The ruling indicates that 'advances' at the inception of a
business may be subordinated, even in the absence of other
types of mismanagement. It also throws light on the extreme-
ly difficult question of when a loan made by a dominant
stockholder to a business in financial difficulties will be
permitted to retain its normal status.
133. Israels, supra note 131, at 393.
134. Krotinger, The "Deep Rook" Doctrine: A Realftf Approach to ParentBsubs 4arY
Low, 42 COLUm. L. Esv. 1124 (1942).
135. Id. at 1129-88, See Sprecher, The Conflict of Equitiea Under the "Deep Rock" Doc-
trine, 43 COLUM. L. Itv. 337, 342-51 (1943).
136. Krotinger, supra note 134, at 1129.
137. 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941).
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A fortiori an advance to an adequately capitalized business
made when insolvency is not threatened will, if made for
proper business purposes, be sustained.
138
The value of this analysis in "piercing" cases is manifest. Share-
holder loans to a corporation made promptly after incorporation
may be thought to presumptively show that the original capitali-
zation was defective which in turn demonstrates a want of business
planning. 139 Additionally, the equitable subordination cases establish
the primacy of inadequate capitalization as a basis for selecting
among conflicting interests in an area where the public interest-
protection of creditors-has generally been deemed paramount.
This should reaffirm the crucial nature of this factor in dis-
regarding corporateness.
Unfortunately the equitable subordination litigation does not
appear to help crystalize the doctrine of disregarding corporateness
to any discernible extent despite the equitable basis and common
components of both doctrines. However, resolution of the questions
arising under both doctrines naturally requires general, vague equit-
able formula and multiple element analysis. The counterpart to
Zubik's formulation was well expressed in Costello v. Fazio:
As stated . . . the question to be determined when the plan
or transaction which gives rise to a claim is challenged as
inequitable is 'whether within the bounds of reason and
fairness, such a plan can be justified.'
Where . . . the claims are filed by persons standing in a
fiduciary relationship to the corporation, another test which
equity will apply is 'whether or not under all the circum-
stances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's
length bargain." 40
The fiduciary relation test is inapposite in disregarding cor-
porateness. The fairness standard, if it can actually be termed a
test, parallels the imprecision and unpredictability of the "piercing"
approach. In spite of these flaws, the subordination fairness test
avoids the confusion of the "mists of metaphor," the entity hurdle,
and considers largely the equities and substance of each case.
Avoidance of the niceties of form to achieve justice is the principal
lesson for courts to learn in borrowing from the subordination cases
in order to improve their approach to disregarding corporateness.
138. Krotinger, supra note 134, at 1131.
139. See, Semmel, Tax Consequences of Inadequate Capitalization, 48 COLUM. L. REv.
202, 214-15 (1948).
140. 256 F.2d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1958).
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE ROLE IN DISREGARDING CORPORATENESS
It is perhaps thought that legislative policy concerning the
limited liability of shareholders is already so well defined and settled
that no further action is necessary. Indeed no change in this area
is contemplated by the draftsman of the Model Business Corporation
Act nor were any revisions initiated in the new enactments per-
taining to close corporations. 141 However, it has been urged that
the present state of affairs is dangerous to the public, especially
where close corporation operations are concerned. 14 2 Criticism of
this sort requires a brief examination of the philosophy and struc-
ture of twentieth century corporation statutes. Professor Katz con-
cludes that current corporation acts reflect
an 'enabling act' theory, more or less modified by the theory
that corporation statutes, while assuring freedom of contract,
should reinforce in various ways the responsibility of indi-
vidual decisions; and the theory that freedom of the parties
should be limited in order that the results of responsible
freedom may more nearly be approximated.148
The elements of the enabling act theory include free availability of
incorporation and limited liability, promoter's freedom in defining
the scope of the corporation and its security structure, and "relatively
unhampered procedures" to accommodate "changing conditions by
effecting changes in corporate purposes and security structures.
' 144
Moreover, most statutes following the enabling act philosophy no
longer embrace the idea of a "capital fund, or margin of safety,
for creditors as a substitute for the personal liability of share-
holders." Such statutes also authorize formal, and occasionally in-
formal, reductions of capital without safeguarding existing share-
holders. The result is that creditors must "make their own bar-
gains for the limitation of their risk.' 45 Corporate statutes seek to
avoid being unduly restrictive despite a wide divergence of profes-
sional opinion concerning their appropriate objectives. Although
acknowledging some recent notable improvements in state regula-
141. Scott, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 24 Bus. LAw 291 (1968).
In terms of shareholder liability the issues with continuing vitality include liability for
" watered, bonus, or discount" shares which are unlawfully issued, whether legally quali-
fied consideration is given for shares and whether property exchanged for shares has been
overvalued.
142. Note, supra note 60. See also Winer, Proposing A New York "Close Corporation
Law", 28 CORNELL L.Q. 318, 314 (1943) ("[B]ecause of the limited assets at risk, the state
Pas the same interest in protecting those who trade with a close corporation as with a
public corporation, and the same interest in their tort victims. The assets must not be
distributed or dissipated at at expense of the third parties").
143. Katz, The Philosophy of Midoentury Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CoNTKMP. PROB.
177, 187-88 (1958). The new Delaware General Corporation Statute epitomizes this phi-
losophy.
144. Id. at 179.
145. Id. at 181-83.
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tion of corporations, Professor Jennings correctly observes "incor-
poration statutes of the more 'liberal' states are essentially enabling
acts, which contain many loopholes for an irresponsible manage-
ment and a minimum of protective provisions in the interest of
shareholders." 1'6
The trend in corporation statutes described by Katz and Jennings
has not been arrested. After an extensive survey of changes in
corporation statutes between 1959 and 1966, Professor Folk found
a "negative development"-"state statutes are obviously becoming
increasingly lax as they give management more and more leeway
in handling corporate affairs.' '1 47 A more alarming development to
some concerned with protecting parties outside the corporation is
the fact:
The Model Act, typifying most newer statutes, makes no
advance in protecting creditors, and, indeed it is doubtful
that this should be a proper function of the incorporation
provisions. Most statutes require only nominal capital, if
any at all, and exact only a liability to pay the unpaid
portion of this minimum capital ... a corporation may start
doing business with a one dollar capitalization. . . Whether
or not this will induce courts to extend the common law
authority subjecting an insider to personal liability will
depend largely upon whether courts read the statutorily
required minimum capital as abrogating any common law
liabilities.
The problem is one which corporate law revisers have given
up on, hoping that commercial practice, availability of in-
formation, and creditor self interest will take up the slack.148
Under the statutory conditions posited by Folk, only a contract
creditor, but not a tort claimant, of the corporation could expect
to be sufficiently enlightened to protect his interests.
This enabling act spirit pervades both the general corporation
statutes under which publicly held corporations operate and to a
greater extent the special legislation designed for close corporations.
Minimum legislative restraints on how management should con-
duct the business characterize both statutes,'149 but only under the
special close corporation provisions are the owners authorized to
approximate complete permissiveness. 15 0 Even though most corpor-
146. Jennings, The Role of the States in corporate Regulation and Investor Protection,
23 LAw & CON'vEMP. PnoB. 193, 194 (1950).
147. Folk, supra note 58, at 281.
148. Folk, supra note 58, at 122-23. See also ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr. ANN. §
51, para. 2.02(2) (1960).
149. See note 69 supra for a discussion of the shaping of new judicial controls over pub-
lic companies.
150. Statutory permissiveness is complemented by judicial concessions. Galler v. Galler,
32 IU1.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964). But see a concerned discussion of this cas in Elson,
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ate specialists doubtless approve of partnership flexibility for the
close-corporation the sharp dissent registered to the nonregulatory
legislative current is thought provoking.
A student writer has raised the question in terms of shareholder
responsibility for corporate torts stating: "Corporations owned by
affluent shareholders, yet too impoverished to meet their tort
liabilities, are the inevitable product of present day incorporation
laws." 151 Supported by certain recent egregious decisions,152 it is
argued that corporation acts encourage financial irresponsibility, or
worse, by granting limited liability to shareholders in the smaller
enterprises. 153 This point is hardly novel for a traditional purpose of
incorporation has been to evade accountability for all business
debts including tort liability. Yet difficult questions are raised con-
cerning the efficacy of existing corporate legislation and legal doc-
trine in protecting the interests of creditors. A creditor, least of all
the tort creditor, cannot safely anticipate that the enterprise will
have adequate capital to cover its reasonable liabilities, given the
nominal or minimum capital requirements of corporation statutes.,,
Provisions in corporate enabling statutes generally prohibit the
creditor from reaching the shareholder directly for any loss or
injury, unless the shareholder happens to act in a management
capacity too.15 5 It is also argued the alternative rationale under the
"piercing" doctrine fail to afford tort creditors adequate protection. 15
It cannot be categorically stated close corporation shareholders are
virtually immune from tort claims if the entity is properly main-
tained (whatever that may mean),'57 but it is perhaps true share-
holder-managers in the close corporation, through their operational
Shareholder Agreements, A Shield for Minoritp Shareholders of Close Corporation, 22 Bus.
LAW. 449 (1967).
151. NOte, supra note 60 at 1190-91.
152. E.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
See Note, supra note 60, at 1190, n. 1 for an indication of the serious losses suffered by
an unsuccessful tort claimant.
153. Note, supra note 60, at 1191 singles out shareholders in taxicab, real estate, enter-
tainment, shipping and manufacturing concerns as unwelcomed beneficiaries of this pro-
tection from tort liability. To these might be added new businesses being formed under
the "black capitalism" program in ghetto areas, small construction firms, and private and
nonprofit urban redevelopment corporations engaging in land acquisition, slum clearance,
rehabilitation, and housing construction. See, An Act to Establish a Corporation for Urban
Development, 5 HAav. J. Lzais. 529 (1968); Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation-A Ne-
glected Stepchild Comes of Age, 22 Bus. LAW. 951 (1967); Note, The Legal Framework
Governing Operation of Modern Nonprofit Corporatio", 47 IA. L. REv. 1064 (1962) (criti-
cizing outmoded state statutes).
154. Supra note 148.
155. See the statutes cited supra note 59.
156. Note, supra note 60. It Is charged imposing personal liability when Individual and
corporate assets are mixed or a misrepresentation is made applies only to contract claim-
ants. Undercapitalization is both misunderstood and merely a single factor in "piercing"
Cases. Non-observance of corporate formalities as a ground for "piercing" Is a mockery
because of the ease of compliance with the statute and the difficulties in proving devia-
tions therefrom.
157. E.g., Thoni Trucking Co. v. Poster, 243 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1957); Minton v. Cav-
aney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 CaL Rptr. 641 (1961) ; Allen v. Morris Bldg. Co., 360
Mich. 214, 103 N.W.2d 491 (1960).
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control, have a clearer responsibility to furnish adequate assets or
insurance coverage. 5 The privilege of limited liability must be
balanced with the ends of tort law as well as contract law, but it
might be that sufficient assets to cover corporate debts could be
assured if undercapitalization was understood and properly weighed
by the courts in "piercing" cases.
Despite the fact empiric evidence does not conclusively estab-
lish the need for legislative intervention on behalf of creditors,
just such a solution is proposed. 159 The statutory solution, which has
been proposed to protect tort creditors and apply only to close
corporations because of their peculiar nature, could take one of two
forms. The first approach would require imposing personal liability
on shareholders, should the claim exceed corporate assets, which
effectively "pierces" the veil without involving problems of legal
doctrine.160 This requirement is not harsh for the shareholders
could readily purchase insurance or set up reserves to meet such
obligations. Arguably such a statutory requirement also removes
the potential disincentive in existing statutes to plan the business
carefully. The alternative approach, compulsory liability insurance
for close corporations, does not seem any more burdensome.' 6'
Most businesses today find it essential to purchase casualty or
liability insurance and the cost is unlikely to be prohibitive. 6 2 The
158i See Note, &upra note 60, at 1193.
159. Note, supra note 60, at 1198-1201. Legislative action would diminish the expense,
time and anguish Involved in bringing damage suits based on the "piercing" doctrine.
160,. Note, supra note 60, at 1201, n. 44. The scope of the statute would be restricted to
concerns whose common stock is not owned "by or for not more than twenty-five persons,
not counting those who own stock representing neither one Per cent or more of the out-
standing common stock nor more than a book value of $10,000." The proposed statute, re-
flecting a distinction made by courts on some "piercing" cases, would preserve limited lia-
bility for shareholders lacking significant power over the close corporation's affairs and
hold personally liable its active managers (officers and directors), influential shareholders
(owning more than ten per cent of the concern's outstanding stock), and any senior se-
curityl holder exercising authority over the firm. Id. at 1199, n. 40. Several questions are
immediately raised. Why a limitation to only 25 shareholders? See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8
§ 342 (a) (1) (1967) (record shareholders of close corporations cannot exceed thirty).
Why exclude contract creditors from the protection of the statute if the courts make such
tortuous use of the "piercing" doctrine? In imposing personal liability for corporate torts
on those owning secutrities "for other than investment purposes", is a standard created
which actually facilitates the court's task? What if a shareholder owns considerably more
than ten per cent of the firm's outstanding stock (thus presumably not for investment
reasons) but does not direcitly involve himself in Its business affairs? Is this sufficient to
immunize him or does he still have a duty to appoint or hire competent personnel and as-
sure prudent operations? What is an active participant "in management of the enter-
prise"? Row is the proposed statute affected by the new close corporation statutory pro-
visions aupra note 59? The suggested statute does provide for a scheme of contribution
among affected security owners. Id. at 1201 n. 44.
161. Note, supra note 60 at 1201-03. But problems admittedly exist. Such regulation will
mean increased administrative costs for the state. Different types of small enterprises re-
quiring different insurance coverage make an orderly approach difficult. An alternative to
insurance-a "declaration of realizable assets"-is also recommended. Id. at 1203. But is this
a substantial Improvement over granting the Secretary of State or State Corporations Com-
missioner authority to determine in each case whether the corporation starts business with
adequate resources (with some provision for systematic, periodic re-evaluation In the light
of current business) or insisting courts merely give greater weight to under-capitalization
in applying the "piercing" doctrine? Compare Sterling, California Securities Law of 1968:
Underwritings and Corporate Reorganizations, 23 Bus. LAW. 645, 647 (1968).
1621 Note, supra note 60 at 1203-04 states six reasons for preferring the imposition of
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proposed statutory solution is bottomed on two assumptions which
seem open to serious dispute. It is by no means clear that the
alternative approaches to "piercing" the corporate veil are inade-
quate if properly applied.1 6 3 The fault conceivably lies in the failure
of courts to comprehend the importance and meaning of under-
capitalization and the need to balance equities more than pay
respect to the separate entity idea. The passage of time has es-
tablished the need for special legislation for close corporations,
but the same cannot be said of the proposed solution. To justify
such legislation it is necessary to define the problem's dimensions
by something other than recitation of several poorly reasoned
cases. However, if Dean Tennery's evaluation of the manipulative
and risk transference potential of close corporations is accurate it
is possible additional legislative restrictions may be in order to
protect creditors. The proposed statutory solution is not unprecedent-
ed in view of the provisions in state constitutions and corporation
enabling acts imposing liability on shareholders beyond their equity
investment. Yet considering the recent legislative attempts to facili-
tate organization of close corporations it is unrealistic to anticipate
widespread acceptance of proposed provisions which might actually
discourage formation of close corporations.
The concern over creditors which generated the proposed statu-
tory solution is counterbalanced by a fear the new close corporation
statutes will induce courts to more readily impose personal liability
on shareholders.1 4 This belief is premised on the notion the elimina-
tion of traditional corporate formalities from these statutes renders
close corporations more vulnerable to attack under the "piercing"
doctrine. Evidence to substantiate this danger is hard to discover
and long standing judicial approval of informal management prac-
tices in close corporations seems to militate against it. Nevertheless,
Professor Bradley has suggested a statute to insure judicial
respect for the limited liability principle.1 6 5 His proposed statute
would link the entity concept and limited liability privilege and
leave them unaffected by the presence of control agreements or
stock transfer restrictions endemic to close corporations. Persons
"voluntarily" dealing with the corporation would be confined to its
assets in satisfying claims in the absence of "actual fraud." Even
personal liability pursuant to a statute. But the Insurance needs of corporations are grow-
ing in proportion to their new amenability to liability. See Note, Liability Insurance for
Corporate Executives, 80 HARV. L. REv. 648, 651 n. 21 (1967) (directors' and officers' lia-
biilty insurance is expensive).
163. See Comment, supra note 81; Comment, Corporations: Preserving the Separate En-
tity of the Oklahoma Close Corporation, 21 OKLA. L RPv. 205 (1968). Further, the leading
writers supra note 6 are not generally critical of the prevailing formulation and use of
the doctrine.
164. Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corpora-
tion Statutes, 1968 DuKE L.J. 525, 553-54.
165. Id. at 554.
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if there is a legitimate basis for Professor Bradley's fear of increased
close corporation shareholder liability it is doubtful that his statute
would prevent courts from refusing recognition to limited liability.
There is agreement in principle that the limited liability of
shareholders is not absolute and that creditors may, in exceptional
cases, reach beyond corporate assets. There is also agreement
that the immediate problem relates to close corporations. But at
this point disagreement exists-one statute is proposed to help
tort creditors overcome limited liability and another is suggested
to sustain the privilege against judicial onslaught. Professor Bradley
abhors "literal enforcement" of a "capital corresponding to rea-
sonable contingencies" test, but seems to ignore tort claimants:
Creditors, of course, are free to negotiate the terms . . .
with the corporation. Thus, if a question exists as to the
probable success of the venture, the creditors should insist
upon an appropriate security . . . or . .. a personal guarantee
from shareholders. Because of this contractual freedom and
the opportunity for prior investigation into the stability of
the enterprise, creditors should not be entitled to a judicial
inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the capitalization ...
While creditors deserve protection against deception and
unfair dealing, they are risk-takers in much the same sense
as shareholders .... 16
Qualifying the limited liability of shareholders on the basis of
equitable considerations certainly requires differentiating among
creditors' claims and makes systematic statutory treatment of the
problem difficult, if not impossible. Statutes may prove to be
ameliorative and indeed a partial answer to some of the problems
that are anticipated will arise from the distinct nature of the close
corporation, but it is doubtful whether any statute can provide a
definitive and comprehensive solution to these problems. Therefore,
proponents of specific statutory solutions must recognize that
at the most the "piercing" doctrine may only be modified.
V. CONCLUSION
Over a period of time legitimate dissatisfaction is often ex-
pressed with the formulation, or more likely, the application of a
judicially developed doctrine and its results. The principal charge
is usually that the judicial doctrine is not sufficiently relevant to
new and constantly changing needs and conditions. This also seems
to be the overriding concern with the "piercing" doctrine in relation
to the close corporation which is gradually assuming almost full
166. Id. at 554.
404
CORPORATE LIMITED LIABILIT
partnership procedural trappings. One view is that the contempo-
rary "piercing" doctrine affords little or no protection to those
who may sustain injury or loss from a close corporation's activities.
A diametrically opposed view asserts that the doctrine has been
applied excessively so as to frustrate use of the close corporation
form of doing business. Both views may raise genuine problems
under the "piercing" doctrine, but the evidence marshalled to date
makes it exceedingly difficult to establish the urgency of one over
the other. Implicit in this divergence of opinions, however, is the
perception that separate legislative and judicial treatment of the
close corporation has not included an appreciation of the potential
problems that may arise from permissive management practices.
Reservations about the pertinency of the "piercing" doctrine
relative to the problems peculiar to the close corporation never
seem to recognize that courts have successfully dealt with the
problems of partnerships for a long time. This experience should
be of some value as close corporations steadily acquire a more
independent legal status. It is a harsh, and perhaps unwarranted,
judgment to write of the "long-discredited 'tests' for 'piercing the
corporate veil' " which are "too numerous and irrational.11 67 One
simply cannot ignore the fact that courts do, and will continue, to
use equitable formulas and consider multiple factors in disregarding
corporateness. The "piercing" doctrine is resilient and therefore
able to adapt to new situations. Further, legislatures have shown
no disposition over the years to tamper with a doctrine that does
not appear to have perceptibly impeded the formation of corpora-
tions. Thus, it is more plausible to discuss the doctrine as "a sensible
weighing of all the facts [which] indicates a real abuse or
perversion of the corporate privilege.' 1 68 Concedely, in this difficult
area, the courts cannot offer exactitude in terms of appropriate
standards for disregarding corporateness-hardly an anamoly in
our legal system. Rationality in the judicial process is achieved
only by the careful sifting of the facts, equities and competing
interests of the parties in each case to accomplish particularized
justice. Since the likelihood of legislative restriction or modification
of the "piercing" doctrine is scant, its critics ought to concentrate
on improving the doctrine itself. If any major criticism can be
leveled at courts using the doctrine, it is that they have sometimes
disengaged from the tough balancing process required and fallen
back on technical considerations and form.8 9 In the long run, better
167. Id. at 553.
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business planning and legal counselling before and after incorpora-
tion would be a more substantial contribution to the solution of the
problems the "piercing" doctrine is designed to resolve.
